Stupid Shit in Kyiv

[Xpartan]

That's certainly a possibility but, at this point, it's difficult to predict exactly how the fault lines might fracture. Whatever kind of civil war might break out would be limited by the fact that most of the available working weapons systems have been sent to the Ukraine front. That means any internal conflicts would primarily be of a small-arms nature.

With respect to nuclear weapons, it's my guess that the major nuclear powers, including China, are not going to sit on the sidelines and let those fall into just any hands, esp not those of terrorists or potential terrorists. They may play a direct part in securing the nukes or they may back those regional leaders or factions willing to guarantee the safety of nuclear assets.

In short, while the shit-show you describe could certainly happen, it's not inevitable. If the Kremlin-based govt weakens or falls then various regions might declare autonomy (1st step) and move later to independence (2nd step). Of course, some might jump straight to, step 2. Either way, they're likely to immediately form alliances to bolster their own security. Regions that are close to China or Turkey could reach out to their stronger neighbor for protection. Or regions in Russia's interior could band together. Again, it's hard to predict, but it doesn't necessarily need to devolve as drastically as you suggest.

That being said, this is the path that might have played out after the fall of the USSR. But the regions might not yet have been ripe for independence, and the central power structures were still strong. But I would still argue that this a long delayed final stage of the USSR's breakup. It's like a domino that's been teetering, refusing to fall, until now.

Of course, nothing is predetermined. My "vision" is based on the inevitability of the final breakup of Russian empire and the mere fact that the Kremlin won't take it lying down. I'm afraid the civil war in Russia is inevitable -- as for severity of it, well, let's hope it won't involve the nukes.

As for China, again I agree that they crucially depend on the West, but so was Russia. Unfortunately, in a battle between logic and totalitarianism the logic always lose.

Seriously, just think how crazy it was for Saddam to go to war against America or for Putin to go to war against the world. And yet, here we are.

[Jmsuttr]

I think for most likely outcome one should look at late history: Georgia, Chechnya, etc. Still going on. A little colder, a little hotter. The Russian troops are forever there to keep the fire smoldering. Still there in Abhazia, still there in Ossetia, still there in Transdnestria. That's the way Russia fights. It outlasts you. Napoleon, Hitler. All went through the same routine. Donbass was in military limbo for 7 years before Russia took the next step. The Blitzkrig against Ukraine didn't work so Russia is settling to what it's accustomed to. The idea is let's see what happens in a few years time.

For two reasons:

1. In the post you replied to, I listed three possible outcomes. In your reply you quoted two of them and completely ignored the third. Which is puzzling, since it was exactly that scenario that's most relevant to what your reply discusses. Here's outcome #3, from my original post, that you left out:

"Something in between #1 and #2, like a partial withdrawal by Russia. But, whether they withdraw to pre-invasion borders or something else, this has no possibility of forming the foundation of any kind of lasting peace. Whether it's a hot war, cold war, ceasefire, or other arrangement, Ukraine will never concede an inch of their territory (as defined by the post-Soviet internationally recognized border) to Russia. Which means that any partial outcome is likely to be nothing more than a lull before the next storm. Just like Russia's invasion in 2014 was a precursor to this one, anything less than a comprehensive peace will contain the seeds of the next conflict. Oh, and all the above elements, like sanctions, war preparations, and so forth, will likely continue".

With respect to your response, one thing you don't address is the qualitative difference between the current situation and those from the past. It's specifically BECAUSE of Russia's past aggressions that the current anti-Russia alliance, including a mix of sanctions and support for Ukraine, exists. Countries that didn't involve themselves before are now fully engaged. Why else would Sweden and Finland change from decades of non-alignment to seeking NATO membership? Why else would Poland and the Baltics be boosting defense spending to previously unseen levels? The simple and obvious reason is that they look at all the examples of Russian aggression you just listed, and the light bulb has finally switched on. They realize that Russia will not stop of its own volition. And they realize that a frozen conflict is just hitting the pause button, and that they are likely next on Russia's shopping list. And most of the rest of Europe, even if they're not on Russia's borders, now understand that, unless they deal with Russia now, they're likely to have a less stable Europe that is constantly under threat.

BTW, your use of Hitler and Napoleon as historical examples is right in line with Russian "great power" propaganda. But it completely fails as an analogy because in both cases Russia was fighting a defensive war, on home soil, and the aggressors had to deal with the logistics required for an invasion. In today's situation, Russia is the aggressor, fighting on foreign soil, and they're struggling mightily with logistics. Maybe if Hitler or Napoleon had systems like HIMARS things might have been different. Oh, and if you think the USSR would have stopped Hitler without MASSIVE amounts of Western aid (look up lend-lease + Soviet Union), I have a bridge over the Kerch Strait that's for sale.

Again, I'm puzzled why you completely sidestepped the one scenario I outlined that was specifically on point.

2. You talk a lot about China (and COVID) yet I didn't mention it in any one of my three scenarios. In fact, my only mention was toward the very end where I pointed out that any help from China is likely to come at a very high cost for Russia. Other than that simple and relatively uncontroversial assertion, I have zero inclination to follow you down your China (and COVID) rabbit-hole.

[WyattEarp]

China. The way it appears to me China is daring the US to impose sanctions on it. Not the Trump tariffs. Serious sanctions. Unlike Russia China has plenty of ways to fight back and that's why meeting between the US Secretary of State and the Chinese foreign minister never seem to go beyond shouting matches. 2006-2008 crisis: if it wouldn't be for China who knows what would've happened in the US. China knows that.

Covid: I believe that it was a reconnaissance by force. No proof, just a hunch. Maybe initially it wasn't meant to be that but wow talking about a present to the Chinese military planners. Covid was gold! China is used to pandemics, you know. SARS1, West Nile, Blue Nile, Green Nile, Bird, Swine, Cow, Sheep, Dog, Moon. They had them all. Compared to SARS1 Covid was not such a big deal. The difference is that SARS1 and Swine flu stayed in China only, while Covid took a spin around the world. Chinese saw how the world reacted. Chinese took notes. China also believes that in the real trade war the Chinese people would be able to handle hardships that such a war would inevitably bring on both sides much better than the Americans and the Europeans would. I know my Americans. I see the reaction to the darn balloon. I think the Chinese are right.

At this point I think the US is afraid of China more China is afraid of the US. Will Chinese supply Russia with ammunition? I'd say they will. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if they are already doing that. I may be wrong but I have a feeling that I'm right.

China's strength is overstated. If you are saying the Chinese helped the World get out of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, their over-investment with a lack of corresponding domestic consumption put pressure on the global economy and still does. Initially, they helped consume and stockpile some commodities, but they still needed a home for their manufactured goods. The commodity boom didn't last long and started to deflate in 2014.

It's easy to think of the country with huge trade surpluses in a position of strength. In reality, it's more of a dependency on the World economy and the USA In particular for end markets. The USA Is already diversifying its manufacturing base.

I don't think helping Russia substantially is currently in their best interests. Hedging their bets is in their best interest.

[WyattEarp]

My heart is certainly on the side of Ukraine, as I believe they have the moral high ground. No matter what criticisms, real or alleged, can be levied against pre-invasion Ukraine, there is no disputing the fact that Russia invaded (not the other way around) and Ukraine has every right to defend their lives and land.

Setting my feelings of support to one side, it's absolutely true that battlefield and geopolitical outcomes will be affected by a host of variables, some of which we don't even know. For example, both Russia and Ukraine understandably keep secret many crucial items of information about the state of their militaries and economies. And, with respect to information that does leak out, it's hard to know for sure if it's accurate, partially accurate, or outright disinformation. And then there are variables that lie in the future, such as how much Western support will continue to flow into Ukraine, for how long, and what will it consist of? Also, will Russia receive any meaningful outside assistance and will it be enough to mitigate battlefield losses?

But, despite the uncertainty, I would argue that it's still a useful exercise to look at the various possible outcomes and evaluate the relative probability of each. Here's one example:

Russia receives military and economic support from Iran, China, India, North Korea, and a few other countries. Of those, it's really only aid from China that has the potential to materially affect the balance on the battlefield. But China, no matter what rhetoric comes out of Moscow or Beijing, has to walk a tightrope as they don't want to become a target of Western sanctions. China's economy is highly dependent on European and US markets and they have plenty of economic issues on their plate without inviting more. That essentially means that outside support levels for Russia have limited upside.

Ukraine's outside support is more complicated as it spans the spectrum from quick and unqualified (Poland, Baltics, Nordics, etc.) to slow and grudging (Germany, France, etc.). But the main difference is that Western support doesn't have the same limitations. It's simply a question of willingness and determination to stay the course. So far, whenever the possibility of "support fatigue" has come up, there's been enough outcry to light a fire under reluctant leaders. Neither Germany or the US were going to provide advanced tanks until pressure from Poland and others was brought to bear. A similar debate is now happening with respect to aircraft and long-range missiles, and it won't surprise me if those weapons systems are provided before long. Compared with Russia's prospects for support, I would argue that Ukraine's has more upside potential.

So, to conjure up a mental picture, it's a bit like two sets of dominoes which, once the lead domino for each is tipped, will lead to cascades of dominoes rippling down different branched paths. While it's not possible to know in advance which branches will reach which endpoints, it is possible to make observations and judgments as to the percentage of positive vs negative endpoints that exist for each set. So that's the basis of my optimism for Ukraine. Not because I have any kind of crystal ball, but simply because I see more positive endpoint probabilities for them than I do for Russia.

I've always been concerned the war becomes a long slog that the Russians just continue to fight when rational minds might say time to pack it up and go home. As many observers have noted, Russia historically fights a long game where it's size, manpower and willingness to bear ridiculous losses give them an advantage. Yes, Russia will be isolated and her economy will suffer. However, this was Russia throughout the twentieth century.

Now that doesn't translate into a Russian victory per se, but it doesn't give the Ukrainians a great outcome. A very satisfying victory might elude both sides.

[Paulie97]

Clowns are like cockroaches, there is never only one.

There's a whole crew of you here though some user names may be sock puppets.

[Nrlmus]

Consider the possible outcomes:

1. Russia's ability to support the war effort, militarily or economically (or both), becomes so depleted that they're forced to withdraw from Ukraine. That would be the kind of loss that no amount of propaganda could whitewash and would likely result in severe negative shocks throughout Russian government and society. Externally there will be strong motivation to hold Russia accountable for their aggression. That would likely mean reparations, war crimes trials, continuation of some sanctions, etc.

2. The West falters in their support of Ukraine and Russia prevails. Assuming that means achieving effective control of all (or most) of Ukraine's territory, the long term challenge will be to hold it in the face of what will surely be a robust "underground" resistance movement. Sanctions will almost certainly continue, in fact it's likely they'll be increased. Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics will move to prepare for the next phase of Russian expansionism, as will NATO. Moldova will urgently seek NATO membership, or some kind of security arrangement, because they'll see themselves as the next target. In short, ALL of Europe will be on a knife-edge. For all those who currently worry about a Russia-NATO war, with WW-III implications, you ain't seen nothing yet!.

I think for most likely outcome one should look at late history: Georgia, Chechnya, etc. Still going on. A little colder, a little hotter. The Russian troops are forever there to keep the fire smoldering. Still there in Abhazia, still there in Ossetia, still there in Transdnestria. That's the way Russia fights. It outlasts you. Napoleon, Hitler. All went through the same routine. Donbass was in military limbo for 7 years before Russia took the next step. The Blitzkrig against Ukraine didn't work so Russia is settling to what it's accustomed to. The idea is let's see what happens in a few years time.

China. The way it appears to me China is daring the US to impose sanctions on it. Not the Trump tariffs. Serious sanctions. Unlike Russia China has plenty of ways to fight back and that's why meeting between the US Secretary of State and the Chinese foreign minister never seem to go beyond shouting matches. 2006-2008 crisis: if it wouldn't be for China who knows what would've happened in the US. China knows that.

Covid: I believe that it was a reconnaissance by force. No proof, just a hunch. Maybe initially it wasn't meant to be that but wow talking about a present to the Chinese military planners. Covid was gold! China is used to pandemics, you know. SARS1, West Nile, Blue Nile, Green Nile, Bird, Swine, Cow, Sheep, Dog, Moon. They had them all. Compared to SARS1 Covid was not such a big deal. The difference is that SARS1 and Swine flu stayed in China only, while Covid took a spin around the world. Chinese saw how the world reacted. Chinese took notes. China also believes that in the real trade war the Chinese people would be able to handle hardships that such a war would inevitably bring on both sides much better than the Americans and the Europeans would. I know my Americans. I see the reaction to the darn balloon. I think the Chinese are right.

At this point I think the US is afraid of China more China is afraid of the US. Will Chinese supply Russia with ammunition? I'd say they will. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if they are already doing that. I may be wrong but I have a feeling that I'm right.

It's not in the Chinese interests for the Ukraine to prevail IMHO. If Ukraine is seen as a victor it would farther boost West and would inevitably seed doubts in the Chinese ability to prevail against Taiwan (or anybody else for that matter) both domestically and abroad while providing an incredible motivational shot in the arm to Taiwan. We all know that the invader is always in disadvantage as is, no matter who the invader is and now if the potential invader is not as sure in its ability to prevail as it was before. Houston, we have a problem.

China needs Russia to prevail over Ukraine and I think it's ready to play a more active part in the conflict. Obviously not as overtly as NATO does but hey. It shares a long woody border with Russia. Who know what crosses it and when, where and how. Obviously it would be stupid for the Chinese to meet Zelensky over their 'peace proposal' and give Zelensky such a huge additional platform to showcase his professional skills. Xi wouldn't even agree to a phone call with Biden why would he want to speak to wonderful and funny Mr. Z.

BTW, very very very funny Mr. Z. I speak Russian and Portuguese fluently and this guy was a top dog. I think I saw most of his clips. Not as funny as Brazilian Porta dos Fundos mind you (few things are) but still very funny.

[Rodeo9112]

That's certainly a possibility but, at this point, it's difficult to predict exactly how the fault lines might fracture. Whatever kind of civil war might break out would be limited by the fact that most of the available working weapons systems have been sent to the Ukraine front. That means any internal conflicts would primarily be of a small-arms nature.

With respect to nuclear weapons, it's my guess that the major nuclear powers, including China, are not going to sit on the sidelines and let those fall into just any hands, esp not those of terrorists or potential terrorists. They may play a direct part in securing the nukes or they may back those regional leaders or factions willing to guarantee the safety of nuclear assets.

In short, while the shit-show you describe could certainly happen, it's not inevitable. If the Kremlin-based govt weakens or falls then various regions might declare autonomy (1st step) and move later to independence (2nd step). Of course, some might jump straight to, step 2. Either way, they're likely to immediately form alliances to bolster their own security. Regions that are close to China or Turkey could reach out to their stronger neighbor for protection. Or regions in Russia's interior could band together. Again, it's hard to predict, but it doesn't necessarily need to devolve as drastically as you suggest..

The US and NATO have contingency options for rapidly moving response forces to secure nuclear stockpiles in other countries in the event their governments topple. That's all I can say.

[VinDici]

Clowns are like cockroaches, there is never only one.

That's right, there's at least 3 of you here. Not sure how you escaped the circus, but here you are regular as clockwork.

[Jmsuttr]

The former Georgian President, a buffoon who chewed on his tie, is now a hospitalized mental case. As we say 'clowns never die they just change each other at the scene'. Clowns are like cockroaches, there is never only one.

Which explains his problems. What's your excuse?

[Questner]

The former Georgian President, a buffoon who chewed on his tie, is now a hospitalized mental case. As we say 'clowns never die they just change each other at the scene'. Clowns are like cockroaches, there is never only one.

[Jmsuttr]

Yeah, right now I'm not sure I see the grand compromise that brings an end to the hostilities long-term. By long-term, I mean a peace agreement is reached and Russia leaves the Ukraine alone without constant pressure indefinitely.

While I don't have the certain optimism of some other pro-Ukraine members here, I think you are painting an incomplete picture. The Ukraine has decided being a Russian satellite is not their future. Russia has forced this decision to be an existential choice for the Ukrainians.

My heart is certainly on the side of Ukraine, as I believe they have the moral high ground. No matter what criticisms, real or alleged, can be levied against pre-invasion Ukraine, there is no disputing the fact that Russia invaded (not the other way around) and Ukraine has every right to defend their lives and land.

Setting my feelings of support to one side, it's absolutely true that battlefield and geopolitical outcomes will be affected by a host of variables, some of which we don't even know. For example, both Russia and Ukraine understandably keep secret many crucial items of information about the state of their militaries and economies. And, with respect to information that does leak out, it's hard to know for sure if it's accurate, partially accurate, or outright disinformation. And then there are variables that lie in the future, such as how much Western support will continue to flow into Ukraine, for how long, and what will it consist of? Also, will Russia receive any meaningful outside assistance and will it be enough to mitigate battlefield losses?

But, despite the uncertainty, I would argue that it's still a useful exercise to look at the various possible outcomes and evaluate the relative probability of each. Here's one example:

Russia receives military and economic support from Iran, China, India, North Korea, and a few other countries. Of those, it's really only aid from China that has the potential to materially affect the balance on the battlefield. But China, no matter what rhetoric comes out of Moscow or Beijing, has to walk a tightrope as they don't want to become a target of Western sanctions. China's economy is highly dependent on European and US markets and they have plenty of economic issues on their plate without inviting more. That essentially means that outside support levels for Russia have limited upside.

Ukraine's outside support is more complicated as it spans the spectrum from quick and unqualified (Poland, Baltics, Nordics, etc.) to slow and grudging (Germany, France, etc.). But the main difference is that Western support doesn't have the same limitations. It's simply a question of willingness and determination to stay the course. So far, whenever the possibility of "support fatigue" has come up, there's been enough outcry to light a fire under reluctant leaders. Neither Germany or the US were going to provide advanced tanks until pressure from Poland and others was brought to bear. A similar debate is now happening with respect to aircraft and long-range missiles, and it won't surprise me if those weapons systems are provided before long. Compared with Russia's prospects for support, I would argue that Ukraine's has more upside potential.

So, to conjure up a mental picture, it's a bit like two sets of dominoes which, once the lead domino for each is tipped, will lead to cascades of dominoes rippling down different branched paths. While it's not possible to know in advance which branches will reach which endpoints, it is possible to make observations and judgments as to the percentage of positive vs negative endpoints that exist for each set. So that's the basis of my optimism for Ukraine. Not because I have any kind of crystal ball, but simply because I see more positive endpoint probabilities for them than I do for Russia.

[Jmsuttr]

I'd venture with #4. Russia's not only forced to withdraw the troops from Ukraine (including Crimea of course) -- it's finally breaking up. The horrific civil war erupts, the likes of which has never been seen. Dozens of new warring states claim their own spot on the map, and some of them, most hostile to Moscow, are tacitly supported by Ukraine. All that becomes a nightmare to the West due to thousands of nuclear warheads that have fallen into the hands of local warlords who're willing to sell to a higher bidder.

That's certainly a possibility but, at this point, it's difficult to predict exactly how the fault lines might fracture. Whatever kind of civil war might break out would be limited by the fact that most of the available working weapons systems have been sent to the Ukraine front. That means any internal conflicts would primarily be of a small-arms nature.

With respect to nuclear weapons, it's my guess that the major nuclear powers, including China, are not going to sit on the sidelines and let those fall into just any hands, esp not those of terrorists or potential terrorists. They may play a direct part in securing the nukes or they may back those regional leaders or factions willing to guarantee the safety of nuclear assets.

In short, while the shit-show you describe could certainly happen, it's not inevitable. If the Kremlin-based govt weakens or falls then various regions might declare autonomy (1st step) and move later to independence (2nd step). Of course, some might jump straight to, step 2. Either way, they're likely to immediately form alliances to bolster their own security. Regions that are close to China or Turkey could reach out to their stronger neighbor for protection. Or regions in Russia's interior could band together. Again, it's hard to predict, but it doesn't necessarily need to devolve as drastically as you suggest.

That being said, this is the path that might have played out after the fall of the USSR. But the regions might not yet have been ripe for independence, and the central power structures were still strong. But I would still argue that this a long delayed final stage of the USSR's breakup. It's like a domino that's been teetering, refusing to fall, until now.

[WyattEarp]

If Pres. Z. , really cared he would be looking for a compromise to end this war, but instead he just keeps moving forward. His country is being destroyed and so many are being killed. If this is winning then, then Ukraine is definitely winning. Ukraine always loses, that is what they are good at, beside corruption, tine will tell.

Yeah, right now I'm not sure I see the grand compromise that brings an end to the hostilities long-term. By long-term, I mean a peace agreement is reached and Russia leaves the Ukraine alone without constant pressure indefinitely.

While I don't have the certain optimism of some other pro-Ukraine members here, I think you are painting an incomplete picture. The Ukraine has decided being a Russian satellite is not their future. Russia has forced this decision to be an existential choice for the Ukrainians.

[VinDici]

As we say 'The circus left but the clowns stayed'.

We as in "the clowns" ?

[Xpartan]

Consider the possible outcomes:

1. Russia's ability to support the war effort, militarily or economically (or both), becomes so depleted that they're forced to withdraw from Ukraine. That would be the kind of loss that no amount of propaganda could whitewash and would likely result in severe negative shocks throughout Russian government and society. Externally there will be strong motivation to hold Russia accountable for their aggression. That would likely mean reparations, war crimes trials, continuation of some sanctions, etc.

2. The West falters in their support of Ukraine and Russia prevails. Assuming that means achieving effective control of all (or most) of Ukraine's territory, the long term challenge will be to hold it in the face of what will surely be a robust "underground" resistance movement. Sanctions will almost certainly continue, in fact it's likely they'll be increased. Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics will move to prepare for the next phase of Russian expansionism, as will NATO. Moldova will urgently seek NATO membership, or some kind of security arrangement, because they'll see themselves as the next target. In short, ALL of Europe will be on a knife-edge. For all those who currently worry about a Russia-NATO war, with WW-III implications, you ain't seen nothing yet!

3. Something in between #1 and #2, like a partial withdrawal by Russia. But, whether they withdraw to pre-invasion borders or something else, this has no possibility of forming the foundation of any kind of lasting peace. Whether it's a hot war, cold war, ceasefire, or other arrangement, Ukraine will never concede an inch of their territory (as defined by the post-Soviet internationally recognized border) to Russia. Which means that any partial outcome is likely to be nothing more than a lull before the next storm. Just like Russia's invasion in 2014 was a precursor to this one, anything less than a comprehensive peace will contain the seeds of the next conflict. Oh, and all the above elements, like sanctions, war preparations, and so forth, will likely continue.

I'd venture with #4. Russia's not only forced to withdraw the troops from Ukraine (including Crimea of course) -- it's finally breaking up. The horrific civil war erupts, the likes of which has never been seen. Dozens of new warring states claim their own spot on the map, and some of them, most hostile to Moscow, are tacitly supported by Ukraine. All that becomes a nightmare to the West due to thousands of nuclear warheads that have fallen into the hands of local warlords who're willing to sell to a higher bidder.