You mean the FSB infiltrated branch of the Orthodox Church?
[QUOTE=Golfinho;2772097]What the Ukrainians can 'withdraw' is their zionazi government. Now that ziolensky has revealed his true colors in attacking the Orthodox Church it's obvious to all.[/QUOTE][URL]https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/kremlin-s-agents-in-robes-or-the-role-of-russian-church-in-the-ukraine-war[/URL]
Oh yeah, funny how there's no outrage about it in Orthodox Ukraine. That's because Ukrainians want to rip every last vestige of corrupt Russia out of their country. And it didn't have to be that way, but Putin has single-handedly turned all of Ukraine against anything that even smells like Russia.
BTW, I hope they sell every "church" property where they found New Russia flags and give the proceeds to REAL charitable organizations.
The corruption canard is a pseudo-argument, at best, a distraction at worst.
[QUOTE=DramaFree11;2772894]Ukraine may want to look internally when it comes to corruption. Maybe they could start eliminating corruption in their own county, just a thought.
Pres. Z. could say that he will not tolerate that behavior, but why stop now.[/QUOTE]Fuck the so-called corruption issue. It's total BS because it fails to address (at least) three key issues:
1. Anyone who is attacked has the right to defend themselves, full stop. And that right has nothing to do with how good or bad that person is or how good or bad others think they are. That right is absolute and remains whether a person is a saint, a devil, or something in between. Even the worst convicted criminal, after having done his time and been released, has the right to defend himself if attacked. Hell, he retains that right even while in prison! So, whether Zelensky, or anyone else in Ukraine, is corrupt or not, they're not obliged to lay down and let a Russian tank run over them.
2. The so-called corruption argument nearly always ignores, or severely downplays, the EXTREME corruption perpetrated by Putin and his Kremlin cronies for DECADES. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there's corruption in both sides, any fair balance would tilt immeasurably against Russia. It's not even a serious debate because there's so much more money sloshing around Russia and they've been stealing it for so long.
3. In forward-looking terms, Ukraine has ambitions of joining both the EU and NATO. As they go through those membership processes they will be under all sorts of scrutiny and will be required to pass laws, change systems, and put in safequards. And what that means is that Ukraine is moving toward becoming a country that works to root out corruption, rather than tolerate it. Meanwhile Russia continues to be a kleptocratic sewer.
For all the above reasons, and I'm sure people will think of more, accusations of corruption are a total red herring. Here's a hypothetical for ya, if Zelensky was found guilty of corruption and removed from office, it wouldn't change Ukraine's absolute right to defend their country and their lives. Not one iota.
Some developments to look out for in the coming weeks
1. The equipment situation: Ukraine will soon be getting IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles) from France, Germany, and the US. Because of their firepower, and other characteristics, the AMX-10 RC, Marder, and Bradley have been described by some as "light tanks," but they have wheels, not tracks. Despite not being a true tank, they will provide a significant upgrade for Ukraine's mobile infantry offensive capability. Will they be a HIMARS-style game changer? Only time will tell and, of course, much will depend on the numbers provided and how well Ukraine handles the new logistics demands.
Ukraine will also be receiving Patriot missile batteries from the US and Germany. One attribute that hasn't received much attention, from what I've seen, is the extremely powerful radar system that comes with that package. I read an analyst's comment that it has the capability of being leveraged to make Ukraine's other air defense assets more effective. If that turns out to be true, then future missile and drone strikes by Russia may be substantially de-fanged. Again, only time will tell.
On the Russian side, the main question is to what degree they'll be able to replace equipment they've already lost. It's hard to assess to what degree sanctions, and the workforce lost to mobilization, are having an effect. One recent report pointed out that a destroyed Russian T-90 tank was a model designed for export rather than the model reserved for Russia's own military. While it's anecdotal evidence, it does raise the question as to Russia's stockpiles (or replacement capability) for that particular piece of equipment.
2. The ammunition situation: Only Russia knows the full extent of their stockpiles. But the rate of artillery fire by Russian forces is drastically reduced (by about two-thirds) from what it was during the summer. There are also reports that Russia has depleted the stores of ammunition held by Belarus, and has also been looking to acquire ammunition from North Korea, which would indicate that they're actively looking both to conserve and to replenish from non-Russian sources. Similarly, heavier reliance on Iranian drones may indicate issues with Russia's supply of missiles.
For Ukraine, the challenge is to manage a dual-supply chain that includes ammo for their legacy systems as well as newly acquired NATO weapons. Ukraine was running low on legacy ammo but captured significant stockpiles during the Kharkhiv offensive. They've also reportedly reconstituted a portion of their domestic ammo production capability. Supplies of ammo for NATO systems will depend on Western deliveries. But, as important as quantity is, quality and accuracy (ex. HIMARS) are also relevant factors. With respect to the situation for both sides, it will be important to focus on what's happening on the battlefields, rather than anything that's being said.
3. The mobilization and training situation: Russia is reportedly planning another large mobilization effort. Whether it will be formally announced, or more low key, remains to be seen. The last mobilization round had quite a few problems and was widely criticized, even by Putin himself. Mobilization also tends to increase outbound migration, unless border restrictions are imposed, as well as drain resources from the civilian workforce. All those mobilized will require training if they're not merely to be thrown at the front line for "cannon fodder" purposes. In the earlier mobilization it appears some were held back for training while others were quickly sent to Ukraine to plug holes in defensive lines. That latter group has understandably suffered a high rate of casualties. Russia's capacity (or inability) to train and equip newly mobilized troops will be something to take note of. Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to benefit from training provided by various Western countries. But what's yet untested is whether Ukraine's forces have the capability to launch the kind of offensive campaign that will be needed to retake significant territory. The Kharkhiv scenario had a number of unique factors that are unlikely to be repeated. If Ukraine wants to move beyond the current battle of attrition, it'll need to raise things to a new level. That being said, Ukraine has been the better side when it comes to using surprising and unexpected tactics. So we'll just have to wait and see what cards are next to be played.
4. The infighting situation: Right now there's a major power struggle between Prighozin (allied with Kadyrov) and the MoD duo of Shoigu and Gerasimov. One way that's manifested is that Russia's regular forces aren't giving normal levels of support to Wagner PMC as they battle in the area of Bakhmut. Prighozin is trying to show that his private army is better and the regular army's leadership will be happy to see him fail. How this plays out and who (if anyone) prevails is anyone's guess. But it's worth watching as power struggles can have significant consequences, even if they're hard to predict. Will Kremlin elites start to take sides? Will Putin swing to one side or the other? Stay tuned!
On the Ukrainian side, the infighting takes the form of debate about supporting Ukraine and in what form and amounts that support should happen. So far those critical of support, like Hungary and Serbia, have been in the minority. But there are no guarantees and situations can always change. Ukraine has done a better job of managing the information war, so far, and it's helped that Russia continues to engage in behavior that sparks outrage in the West.
Non-factors (so far): The China-Russia relationship has essentially been a nothingburger. China is naturally cautious, their economic reliance on Western markets is substantial, and it doesn't help Russia that, to this point, their record on the battlefield is one of losses, rather than gains. Nobody wants to back a loser and China will not want to hitch their wagon to a lame horse. And those China factors don't begin to take into account the significant problems China's experiencing with COVID and economic issues. Comrade Xi is devoting his time, attention, and resources to steady his own ship. Also, the energy weaponization tactic has pretty much fizzled. That could be as a result of warmer than normal temperatures, or it might be the result of good adaptation by European economies. We're not through the winter yet but to this point it certainly hasn't paid the dividends expected by Russia.
The war's not over, the jury's still out, but just wanted to post about the developments I'll be looking out for.
