The problem with predictions
[QUOTE=Golfinho;2684932]The stock answer in context of the future of the dollar for years has been, 'Yes, long-term it's all bad, but there's no place else to go. ' Anyone who's spent anytime in the industry knows this. And now we've reached the point where it's the linchpin openly behind US foreign policy. Question is will this battle with Russia lead to the endgame.
How it came to this should be general knowledge. See Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism (updated from your edition back in undergraduate economics).
Or his take on current situation: [URL]https://michael-hudson.com/category/articles/[/URL].
Of course Putin needs income, which is why he's not giving oil to belligerents that have frozen Russia's accounts. Sanctions have blowback -- in this case so obvious it can only be assumed to have been intentional to, as like the Nuland woman said, eff the E. You. Meanwhile, China will buy Russian oil and gas and pay in yuan which won't be frozen (stolen). The US confiscated Venezuela's foreign holdings, and they even stole poor Afghanistan's. And now Russia's..[/QUOTE]Is that they rely on multiple variables that may not play out in the ways envisioned by the predictive models. There are plenty of opinions out there, and I'm happy to let them argue the issues in their ivory towers. And predictions about the impending demise of the US are the most popular of all.
I'm much more interested in the pragmatic, empirical, and observable. The plain fact of the matter is that, prior to the invasion, Russia had a higher position in the world, politically and economically, than it does now. No matter how the war turns out, Putin has shown himself to be a barbaric war criminal. There's no coming back from that. And there's no coming back from the tens (hundreds?) of thousands of young Russians who have fled to make a future elsewhere.
Similarly, the image of a strong Russian military has been exposed and destroyed. Sure, Russia has their Soviet-legacy nukes, but their conventional forces have been exposed as a paper tiger. That's one reason why, IMO, Sweden and Finland are unmoved by Russian threats over NATO membership.
War is an uncertain and dynamic beast. Looking at a snapshot in time, or even a series of snapshots, and trying to extrapolate a prediction, is a tricky business. The sanctions regime, and any effects thereof, is similarly a dynamic beast. I find predictions as to who will prevail in the end, and how things will turn out, to be mostly exercises in vanity by people anxious to show off how much they know. And I generally find them to be reluctant to admit how much is unknown and how easily something that comes out of left field could screw up their predictions.
Here's just one example: All of the discussions I've seen re sanctions have assumed that China will continue to support Russia. What if that changes? I'm not saying it will, but I would observe that China isn't in a happy place right now, with having to lock down Shanghai (plus other cities, ports, factories, etc.) in their efforts to keep COVID from wreaking havoc. So, while I'm not predicting, I can envision a scenario in which a combination of China's vulnerabilities and Western pressures could have a material impact on support for Russia. My sole reason for laying out this scenario is to point out the hubris of those who make predictions without accounting for, or even discussing, variables that would skewer their theories.
It is, however, possible to lay out possible scenarios and, with an appropriate degree of humility, point out the rough probabilities of each one. But such discussions should also contain plenty of caveats as to how things could drastically change if the landscape of variables shift.
For example, I've continued to assert that there's unlikely to be any scenario in which Russia truly wins. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that they can occupy much or even all of Ukraine. That is likely to be a Pyrrhic victory as it's clear the Ukrainians don't see Russia as a liberator and don't want to be occupied or assimilated. Russia would be viewed as an aggressive occupier, perhaps having to brutally suppress insurgents, and the sanctions regime would continue.
Meanwhile, since oil and gas are fungible, most of Russia's former energy dependents will have switched, or be actively looking to switch, to other suppliers. The recent deal Italy signed with Algeria is a case in point. That would be a permanent loss of income for Russia and a corresponding reduction in leverage.
Again, I'm not in the prediction business and, historically speaking, most people who thought they had it all figured out ended up being wrong more often than right. But I am in the business of making observations. And one clear observation is that the state of Russia today is weaker than the state of Russia before February 24th. It's hard for me to see how a weakened Russia, having been devalued on a number of fronts, turns these deficits into a winning position. Much like chess, at some point the loss of material + poor positioning = a loss. I think Russia will play to the last pawn, unless something happens internally to tip over the king, but I find arguments for a Russian win to be singularly unconvincing.
See my response to Golfinho re problems with predictions
[QUOTE=Jojosun;2685057]It's here in the Title [URL]https://www.politico.com/newsletters/global-insider/2022/04/11/yes-russia-is-still-winning-00024373[/URL].
Whizzing through sources, the above caught my attention and read it more than once.
;If you think Russia isn't winning from its invasion of Ukraine, consider this: Moscow's monthly gas export receipts have tripled from a year ago; Marine LE Pen leads a Russian-sympathizing political bloc that is within reach of the French presidency; and from today, Western leaders will once again start arriving in Moscow to court President Vladimir Putin into a Ukraine settlement.
In other words: You can win even when you're being humiliated on the battlefield.
On the European front, Putin's supporters win elections in Hungary & Serbia [URL]https://edition.cnn.com[/URL] europe h.[/QUOTE]I'm doubtful LE Pen will win in France. She made it to the 2nd round in 2017, was polling less than Macron at that time, and lost. She's now made it to the 2nd round again, it's a similar situation to that in 2017, and I'll be surprised if the outcome isn't the same.
Predicting a winner at this point is a fool's errand, of course, but even if she wins she'll be constrained by France's membership in the EU. Hungary's Orban has already encountered similar constraints.
One possible LE Pen victory scenario is that she could certainly set a Frexit in motion. That would free France from EU constraints, but that's a years-long process even assuming she has enough support. Unless and until that happens, any friendly overtures toward Russia would have to conform to EU restrictions.
Politico, CNN, and The Times are certainly entitled to their predictions. But they're not immune to the pitfalls that come with that territory, which I detailed in my response to Golfinho.
Can they pay in quatloos?
[QUOTE=Xpartan;2685169]They can accept Martian dirhams for what I care. No one is paying in rubles except his buddy Orban.[/QUOTE]Bonus points if you know where that reference is from!
