I understand your displeasure Igor.
[QUOTE=Xpartan;2971058]Chechnya's self-governing mafia don and Putin's pet Kadyrov shot an anti-aircraft Pantsir-S1 missile at an Azerbaijani passenger flight that was attempting to land at Chechnya's Grozny Airport. Despite the heavy damage and desperate pleas from the pilots, the plane was denied landing at Grozny, as well as 2 other Russian airports in Makhachkala and Mineralnye Vody and was instructed to cross the Caspian Sea and land in Kazakhstan. On approach to Aktau airport in Kazakhstan, the plane crash-landed killing 38 people on board including both pilots.
The Russians were likely hoping that the plane would dive into the sea, making it difficult if not impossible to identify them as the culprits. Some experts allege that Russia had intentionally turned off the plane's navigation system to further complicate any attempts at recovery. Unfortunately for them, the pilots managed to cross the Caspian Sea and reach the airport. As a result, 27 people survived the crash.
In Putin's Russia planes down missiles. What a country![/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=BloodRed;2971436]'Some Experts'. Yeah.[/QUOTE]While it would be more preferable to get this from a few world-reknowned experts (and I hope we will at some point), but honestly, what would it change? Your guilt in the MH17 downing was established by two European courts well beyond reasonable doubt, with the help of the most prominent aviation and security experts in the world, yet you keep denying. I mean, seriously, for a country that looks like a lying duck, swims like a lying duck, squawks like a lying duck and lies like a lying duck, "some experts" will always be a more trustworthy source compared to [U]anything[/U] coming out of your mouths.
[QUOTE]However, new reports claim that Russia denied the plane an emergency landing, despite it suffering critical damage and the pilots repeated pleas, at three different airports.
The Azeri Times also claims that Russia then tampered with the planes GPS system, forcing the pilot to divert the plane over the Caspian Sea.
The outlet says this was a deliberate attempt to make the plane crash in water to conceal any evidence of an attack.
Earlier, aviation analysts said images from the crash site point to damage from an air defence system, while multiple sources have told the Reuters news agency the same.[/QUOTE][URL]https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/russia-denied-emergency-landing-azerbaijan-airlines-plane-jammed-gps-crash/[/URL]
Current position of the RF on the conflict
As quoted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
On negotiations to resolve the Ukrainian conflict:
We have always been and remain ready for negotiations. I would like to particularly emphasize that we can only talk about reliable, legally binding agreements that should eliminate the root causes of the conflict and which should include a mechanism to make it impossible to violate them.
On Trump's Ukraine Peace Initiative:
Judging by numerous leaks and Donald Trump's interview with Time magazine on December 12, he is talking about freezing military actions along the line of combat contact and transferring further responsibility for the confrontation with Russia to the Europeans. Of course, we are not satisfied with the proposals made by representatives of the president-elect's team to postpone Ukraine's membership in NATO for 20 years, as well as to introduce a peacekeeping contingent of British and European forces into Ukraine.
About the Ukrainian peace summit:
In October, meetings were held in preparation for the second peace summit. They want to invite Russia to it, as we understand, in order to present us with some kind of ultimatum. I have explained many times that we are not going to take part in the peace summit, even if we receive an invitation.
Ensuring Ukraine's non-aligned status remains the goal of the special military operation (SMO), which will be achieved.
2025 Prognosis from Ukraine
In Russia no prognosis has been made for 2025, only plans. Here below in a quote a prognosis from Ukraine for 2025:
The atmosphere in which Ukraine is celebrating the new year 2025 is strikingly different from the situation in both December 2022 and December 2023.
December 2022 was a time when the Ukrainian Armed Forces had just recently achieved major successes – Kherson and almost the entire Kharkiv region were liberated. The country lived in anticipation of the coming counteroffensive and imminent victory.
December 2023 was marked by disappointment, fatigue, anxiety and uncertainty. The counteroffensive had failed, the Russian army had seized the initiative at the front. Hopes for turmoil and destabilization in Russia had also gone up in smoke with the failure of Prigozhin's rebellion. It was becoming clear that there would be no quick victory, the war was dragging on, its outcome was unclear, and the casualties could be very high.
The year 2024 has brought even more difficulties and problems to Ukraine. However, this December is marked by new hope. But hope no longer for victory by reaching the 1991 borders (Zelensky has already acknowledged the impossibility of achieving this by military means), but for a quick end to the war and peace. It appeared after Trump's victory in the US presidential election. Since he has repeatedly repeated (and repeats) that he intends to end the war as soon as possible.
Will this work out? This is the main question that we will discuss today in our forecast for the coming year.
1. The situation at the front: Russia has seized the initiative and the Kursk phenomenon:
The situation at the front in 2024 was characterized by the transfer of the initiative to Russia. The Russian army advanced all year along almost the entire front line. The exception was the Kursk region. However, even there the breakthrough of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was stopped quite quickly, did not reach the supposed main goal (the Kursk NPP) and now the Russians are gradually recapturing the territory.
Neither before nor after were the Ukrainian Armed Forces able to repeat the Kursk breakthrough, although they tried (they attacked the Belgorod region, and the Bryansk region, as well as the Kursk region in other places, but without success).
In other areas, the Russians made progress, accelerated, among other things, by the transfer of some of the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Kursk region.
The most significant advance was in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhov area, where the Russian army conducted its strategic operation to push the front line away from Donetsk and Mariupol with counterattacks from the north and south. We wrote back in early August that this was exactly the plan the Russians had in this direction, and our forecast came true almost entirely.
The Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo operation of Russian troops is also the creation of a bridgehead for a further offensive on the Dnieper and Zaporozhye, entering the rear of the main lines of defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, located on the southern front along the line "Vremyevsk salient. Gulyaipole - Orekhov. Kamenskoye". It is unknown, however, whether the Russian army has enough reserves for such a large-scale offensive, but a potential strike by the Russian Armed Forces from Kurakhovo, Pokrovsk, Selidovo and Velyka Novoselovka in the direction of Zaporozhye and the Dnieper is currently the greatest threat to the Ukrainian army.
2. Reasons for Russia's success:
There are three main reasons for the success of Russians.
The first is the improvement in the quality of combat management and combat capability of Russian troops, their advantage in weapons (primarily gliding bombs), and also the advantage in drones that began to appear by the end of the year.
The second is the increase in the number of Russian troops in Ukraine while the number of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is decreasing. This point is very important, as it makes senseless numerous discussions about the ratio of losses, the rate of mobilization, etc. The dynamics of the number of troops on the battlefield is an integrated indicator that takes into account all the above variables. And the fact that there are more Russians at the front, and fewer Ukrainians, since the rate of mobilization does not cover the current losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, is confirmed both officially and unofficially by both sides.
The third is the decline in discipline and morale of the Ukrainian troops due to unclear prospects for a protracted war, the lack of major victories, and the death of a large number of ideological and motivated volunteers and their replacement by low-motivated "busified" recruits. Hence the increase in the number of AWOLs and cases of refusal to carry out orders in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (we wrote about this in more detail here).
3. The main indicators of the situation at the front:
There are two opposing assessments regarding the future prospects. According to one, the Ukrainian army is moving towards rapid collapse, depletion of reserves and collapse of defense. According to the second, nothing critical is happening for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian army is accumulating reserves (moreover, a number of Russian military bloggers believe that Ukraine may use them for an offensive in the near future), and the Russian Federation's reserves are quickly depleted and, soon, the Russian offensive will begin to stall and stop.
It is impossible to say exactly which of these versions is correct due to a lack of information.
However, it is possible to identify several indicators that will indicate that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are critically losing their combat capability and their reserves are exhausted.
The first is the expulsion of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, control over the bridgehead in which is of great political importance to the Ukrainian authorities, and if there are not enough forces to hold it, this will be evidence that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a very serious shortage of reserves even for priority areas.
The second is the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kharkov, to stop the Russian advance to which serious forces of Ukrainian troops were sent in the spring and summer of this year, and if they are unable to hold the defense, this will also be evidence of the depletion of reserves.
Third – Dnieper and Zaporozhye. A breakthrough to them by Russian troops will mean a disaster for the logistics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the entire southern front and a significant part of the eastern one. And if the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have enough reserves to protect this direction, this means that events will develop according to the worst-case scenario for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Fourth – the creation by the Russians of a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper – in the Kherson area and / or in the Dnieper and Zaporozhye area (if the Russian Federation is able to capture these cities). This will create a potential threat of an offensive by the Russian army in the direction of Transnistria, cutting off Ukraine from the sea. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are unable to prevent it, this will be evidence of a critical decline in the combat capability of the Ukrainian troops.
Fifth, the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kyiv, which will create the threat of a complete military defeat of Ukraine.
But none of this is happening yet.
The Ukrainian army is retreating with fighting in the Donetsk region, but the front is not collapsing, the combat capability and controllability of the Ukrainian troops is maintained, critical supply lines of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not been cut off, and Russian troops have not approached the largest Ukrainian cities.
Of course, the problems that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have have a cumulative effect and when there are too many of them, the front may collapse "in one moment". But we also cannot rule out another option, that the Russian army will sooner or later exhaust its reserves in the offensive and stop before reaching strategically important lines.
4. Ukraine's Strategy for 2025 with Trump Adjustments:
The latter assumption underlies Kyiv's basic war strategy.
The Ukrainian military-political leadership assumes that the Russian army will soon exhaust its offensive potential, without advancing anywhere except Donbass, Ukraine will accumulate forces, make a breakthrough in the creation of robotic systems, as well as long-range missiles that can reach Moscow, and somehow solve the problems with replenishing the army (for example, by lowering the age of mobilization to 18 years). After which it will be able to seize the initiative at the front.
Russia, as Kyiv believes, will be forced to declare mobilization in such a situation, which, according to the calculations of the Ukrainian authorities, should lead to internal upheavals in the Russian Federation. Plus, as before, Kiev has hope for the growth of Russia's socio-economic problems due to the effect of sanctions, as well as the growth of interethnic and interreligious contradictions within the Russian Federation. First of all, between Russians and Muslims.
Based on this, the Ukrainian authorities, as well as the Western "war party", are against the earliest possible end to the war along the front line, believing that time is on the side of Ukraine's victory, which, however, is no longer understood as reaching the 1991 borders (although this goal is not completely removed as a maximum task), but rather forcing the Russian Federation to agree to Ukraine's membership in NATO and the presence of Western troops on Ukrainian territory. Kiev understands that Moscow will not agree to such conditions now, and therefore the Ukrainian authorities are against negotiations at this stage (as Yermak directly states). But they believe that in the future the Kremlin's positions on the front will weaken and it will be forced to accept Ukraine's conditions (moreover, rumors are spreading that in the near future, in order to prove the correctness of this thesis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will attempt an offensive on one of the sections of the front).
But this is an assessment by the Ukrainian authorities, which, naturally, may be fundamentally wrong, just as it turned out to be wrong in 2023, when there were expectations of a quick victory after the counteroffensive, or in 2022, when everyone expected the Russian economy to collapse under the weight of sanctions.
In addition, not everyone inside Ukraine believes that the Ukrainian government's strategy is correct. Both in military and political circles, the opinion is increasingly widespread that betting on a "long war" is primarily destructive for Ukraine itself, since it is being exhausted much faster than Russia. And time is working against Kyiv, especially given the political turbulence in the West and the unclear prospects for further aid to Ukraine. According to this point of view, if there is an opportunity to end the war in the near future, it should be ended along the front line and even without guarantees of joining NATO. Because the conditions of peace could be much worse for Ukraine in the future.
But, let us repeat, the position of the Ukrainian authorities is different. Bankova believes that time is on Ukraine's side, and therefore there is no need to negotiate now.
Therefore, many actions of the Ukrainian government and the Western "war party" (we will talk about it in more detail a little later) are aimed at disrupting or making negotiations with Russia as difficult as possible. Hence the permission to strike with long-range missiles, and the attempt to insist on inviting Ukraine to NATO, and the murders of high-ranking Russian officials in Moscow, and much more.
However, it is important to note that Kyiv can only adhere to such a strategy as long as the main position in the US and the West is that of the "war party. ".
If, despite all the efforts of the "hawks", the concept is approved in Washington that the war must be ended as quickly as possible along the front line or on other compromise terms with Russia (and this is what Trump is currently promoting), then Kyiv will not be able to resist it and will be forced to submit to the new American strategy, since it will not be able to continue the war without the support of the West.
And then everything will depend on whether the US can reach an agreement with the Russian Federation on the conditions for ending the war.
The question of how, when and under what conditions the war will end is also decisive for the issues of Ukraine's domestic politics – will there be elections, will Zelensky be able to stay in power.
5. Russia's first possible strategy is to force Ukraine and the West to Putin's conditions:
If the strategy of the Ukrainian government is, in general, clear ("keep fighting, but if Washington says not to fight, then negotiate" then there are two versions regarding Russia's strategy.
The first of them comes from a literal understanding of the Kremlin's official statements about the immutability of Putin's June conditions. The transfer of the entire territory of four regions to the Russian Federation's control, the lifting of sanctions, the limitation of the number and armament of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, "denazification" in Ukraine's domestic policy, the lifting of sanctions, the conclusion of a full-fledged peace treaty with the fixation of new borders as internationally recognized. And without fulfilling all these requirements, as well as without the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, Putin will not stop the war. Also, in the expert circles near the Kremlin, there is an assumption that one of Putin's main goals is the "reboot" of Ukrainian statehood, so as not to have problems with Kiev in the future. Political scientists close to the Russian government are publishing scenarios according to which Ukraine, after the end of the war, will be divided into two parts in the territories remaining under Kyiv's control. Into central Ukraine. A formally independent state loyal and controlled by Moscow, and into western Ukraine, where it is supposed to oust anti-Russian "nationalist elements". Plus, there is the removal from power of Zelensky, whose "illegitimacy" is constantly discussed in Moscow.
It should be noted that Ukraine can accept these conditions only in three cases.
The first is if the West forces it to do so through the most severe pressure and threats.
Secondly, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are completely defeated or find themselves on the brink of imminent defeat.
Thirdly, if Russia can "turn off" Ukrainian energy for a long time and thereby make the functioning of the economy and, in general, the life of people on the territory of Ukraine impossible while the war is ongoing.
There are no signs yet of the West's readiness to put pressure on Kyiv to fulfill Putin's demands. Although even if such coercion were to follow, it is far from guaranteed that the Ukrainian authorities would humbly agree to fulfill all the demands, rather than continue to resist. Because it is one thing to comply with Western pressure to stop the war along the front line (especially since many in Ukraine are also in favor of this). And it is quite another to actually agree to hand over control of the entire country or most of it to Russia.
The second and third conditions have also not been realized and it is not a fact that they can be realized in the foreseeable future.
However, the Kremlin may believe that time is on its side, and therefore there is no need to rush to end the war and make any compromises with Trump and Ukraine, since the situation at the front will continue to worsen for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, energy will gradually be destroyed, and therefore, sooner or later, Ukraine and the West will be forced to comply with Putin's conditions. Moreover, perhaps even tougher ones, in comparison with the June version.
In general, this is the scenario of "long will", which Arestovich often likes to talk about as Putin's main "secret weapon" - to go year after year, despite the sacrifices and difficulties, to the intended goal. As it happened, in its time, with Chechnya. When from the beginning of the Second Chechen War to the moment of its final "pacification" and subordination, 6-7 years passed.
6. Russia's second possible strategy is to stop the war along the front lines:
The second point of view states that the Kremlin is much more cautious in assessing the prospects of the Russian Federation in a long war, and understands the great risks it carries, including the need to implement measures that the Russian authorities do not want to take (for example, mobilization). Therefore, according to this version, Putin is actually set on a speedy and compromise end to the war. Stopping the war along the front line (provided that Ukrainian troops are withdrawn from the Kursk region), and a neutral status for Ukraine. Plus, the fulfillment of some other conditions (for example, the lifting of sanctions, some changes in Ukraine's domestic policy).
Western media, citing sources, write from time to time that Russia's position may be more flexible than officially stated. Moscow's rather restrained reaction to Western long-range strikes on Russia also points to this. A number of observers perceive this as Moscow's desire to take a break until Trump comes to power and not close the door on the possibility of reaching an agreement with him.
In general, it is obvious that there are different points of view in the Russian elites on the issue of the further continuation of the war and the attitude towards the prospect of its quickest stop. Some are in favor of a war to a victorious end. Others consider the war in Ukraine a grand trap that Russia has fallen into. And if it is possible to get out of it relatively painlessly and on favorable terms for the Russian Federation (fixing the gains in Ukraine and its neutral status), then this will already be a grand Russian victory.
And the outcome of the negotiations, if they are initiated by Trump, will largely depend on the position that the Russian Federation takes.
Perhaps the Kremlin really believes that time is on its side and will therefore refuse to compromise, continuing the war. And here the whole question is how soberly the Russian authorities assess the prospects at the front, in the economy and in terms of maintaining stability within the country.
If the assessment of the prospects for the imminent collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defense and the strength of the Russian economy turns out to be wrong, this could have far-reaching negative consequences for Russia. Including causing a deterioration in Moscow's position in the world, especially among the countries of the global south (because the Russian Federation will look like a state that, under some pretexts incomprehensible to the international community, refused the offer to end the war, essentially taking responsibility for further bloodshed, although China has long been calling for the war to end), the positions of those forces in the West that advocate compromises with Moscow will sharply weaken, since the Kremlin will show that it is not ready to compromise at all. This could also cause strong internal tension in Russian society due to the understanding that the war will last a long time and the authorities do not want to stop it. This tension will be especially aggravated if a new wave of mobilization has to be declared.
However, let us repeat, in order for the Kremlin to accept or reject peace proposals, these peace proposals must come. Come from Trump. And therefore, it is his position that will be decisive.
7. Trump's Decisive Choice:
Despite repeated statements by Trump and his associates about their intention to end the war in Ukraine in a short time, this option is far from certain.
It is not even predetermined that Trump will put forward peace proposals that would be at all acceptable to the Russian Federation as at least a start for a conversation.
The policy of the West, and the United States in particular, has been determined in the last three years by the "war party", which believes that the war in Ukraine is a grand trap for Moscow and a unique opportunity to weaken and exhaust Russia.
And therefore this "party" is categorically against stopping the war in the near future, since this will nullify all previous efforts and, in its understanding, will allow Putin to slip out of the trap into which he has been drawn for many years. And even to slip out on de facto "victorious" terms, keeping the captured territories and removing the question of Ukraine's entry into NATO.
As arguments for continuing the war, this "party" uses the above-mentioned theses about the imminent "collapse of the Russian Federation" under the weight of military and domestic problems, convincing Trump not to offer Putin compromise options for peace, but to continue fighting. In particular, there are many supporters of this point of view within the Republicans. However, the "war party" is very strong at almost all levels of Western policy management. It was this party that laid the strategic line of action for the West in relation to Ukraine and Russia. And it will be extremely difficult for Trump to reverse this course.
Although it is possible.
The arguments of the "party of peace" are also well known. Time is not working for Ukraine, conditions will be even worse. The West itself is in a systemic crisis caused by deindustrialization, the decline in competitiveness of its economy, and the huge emission of dollars and euros. In such conditions, it is extremely problematic to continue increasing military spending by getting involved in a war, since it is fraught with either hyperinflation or a sharp reduction in social spending and the actual dismantling of the welfare state in the West (and along with this, the dismantling of democracy, since, understandably, no one will vote for such changes in the elections).
Finally, the threat of nuclear war hangs like the sword of Damocles. All this provides arguments to those forces in the West that call for a speedy ceasefire in Ukraine.
In addition, the most important factor that plays against the "war party" in the West is the failure of its strategy for the war in Ukraine. Initially, it assumed that Western sanctions would destroy the Russian economy and Putin's regime would quickly collapse. After this did not happen, the thesis began to be promoted that the Russian army was extremely weak and would be defeated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and, in parallel, the theory was promoted that in Russia, against the backdrop of defeats, unrest would inevitably begin.
However, these two theses were also nullified in 2023, when the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces ended in failure, and Prigozhin's mutiny failed. Therefore, when the "war party" now promotes the theme that "we need to wait a little longer and Russia is about to collapse", trust in this in the West has been seriously undermined. And the proposals of some representatives of the "war party" to turn the situation around by sending European troops to Ukraine or through other forms of deeper NATO involvement in the war only scare off both Western elites and societies, setting them in favor of a speedy end to the war in order to avoid such a prospect. In general, the West is experiencing disappointment, fatigue, anxiety, as well as a decline in belligerence after the collapse of previous strategies on Ukraine and Russia. And this is also the most important factor that works in favor of the "peace party".
Moreover, the position of the "war party" was based on a deep contradiction from the very beginning. Namely, the desire, on the one hand, to harshly punish Russia for invading Ukraine with fatal consequences for Putin's government. On the other hand, the unwillingness to enter into a direct war with it due to the fear of a nuclear conflict and the bet that the tasks would be carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces alone. Although the difference in potential between Ukraine and Russia made such a bet, to put it mildly, very risky. Moreover, as it turned out during the war, the West was afraid to bring Russia even to the brink of defeat, due to the same threat of a nuclear war. Western media have repeatedly written that back in the fall of 2022, Washington came to the conclusion that if the Russian authorities consider that they are facing military defeat, they can use nuclear weapons. And the desire to prevent this largely determined Washington's behavior regarding the war in Ukraine. Including, regarding assistance to Kyiv, which was provided to the extent that it allowed to prevent the collapse of the front. But in order not to cross the line beyond which a landslide escalation could begin (the so-called strategy of "war on slow fire".
As for the statements about the threat of an attack by the Russian Federation on NATO countries, few people in the West believe that, having fought for weeks and months for one village in Donbas, the Russian army is ready to attack NATO countries that are totally superior to the Russian Federation in military terms. At least as long as the US is a member of NATO.
8. Showdowns within the Republican Party:
The situation within the US Republican Party will play a very important role in the course of events.
There is already a struggle between the "old guard" that generally wants to continue the previous course on Ukraine and elsewhere. And Trump's team, including Elon Musk and others, who want to sharply reshuffle the elite and carry out a radical reform of the state apparatus. And also, what is important, to redistribute financial flows, taking money from traditional military budget contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing and their lobbyists (the main ones of which are the same "old guard" of the Republican Party), and transferring it to a new crop of high-tech companies.
This group also has a completely different view than the establishment on the war in Ukraine and on relations with Russia. This struggle will determine America's course, and therefore the situation in the world.
9. The Impact of Trump's Relations with China and Europe:
It will also be of great importance how Trump builds relations with Europe and China. Confrontational notes are heard from Washington in both directions. And if Trump really gets into a clinch with the Europeans and the Chinese, then this could increase the importance of relations with the Russian Federation for both the EU and China and, consequently, seriously change the attitude of the Europeans to the topic of supporting Kyiv. And China. To the topic of supporting Russia in the war. Moreover, in both directions. Not in favor of Ukraine.
If the confrontation between the US and the EU results in a rupture of their military-political ties and the actual withdrawal of America from NATO, then this will radically change the entire security situation in Europe, giving Russia and China the opportunity to start their game in the European direction, pulling a significant part of the EU countries to their side.
However, the break between the US and Europe is far from predetermined. It is advantageous for the Americans to maintain influence on the EU and on this basis they can come to compromises on various contentious issues.
10. Will Trump and Putin "divide the world"?
One can often come across the point of view that the main issue in the negotiations between the US and Russia will not even be Ukraine, but a new security system in Europe or even the "distribution of zones of influence in the world", as well as issues of Russia's relations with China (according to the widespread version, Trump wants to pull Moscow away from Beijing).
This is certainly an important point that can affect a lot.
On the one hand, such "mega-exchanges" seem unrealistic.
Firstly, Ukraine itself is not of such serious interest to the US that it would enter into any global "deals" with the Russian Federation for its sake. By and large, none of the scenarios for the development of events in Ukraine (including the complete defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the capitulation of Kyiv) are critically bad for Washington. After all, the Americans experienced the loss of Afghanistan quite painlessly. Ukraine is not Mexico or Canada, the situation in which directly affects the US. And not even the Middle East, the situation in which is important for America, since the price of oil is determined there. No global processes or markets critically depend on the situation in Ukraine.
Secondly, as for Trump's attempts to pull Russia away from China, the US will not be able to offer Moscow anything in return. Trump himself has set his sights on the European energy market, which could replace the Chinese market for the Russians, demanding that the Europeans buy more American oil and gas.
On the other hand, American media have often written that there has been a behind-the-scenes dialogue between Trump and Putin for a long time.
In addition, Trump's openly demonstrated desire to ease America's "burden" on security in Europe (in order to shift more attention to China), as well as to minimize the likelihood of a direct US war with Russia (due to the threat of it escalating into a nuclear war) may prompt the new administration in Washington to certain agreements with Putin. For example, on freezing NATO expansion to the east and curtailing US activity in the post-Soviet space.
But, let us repeat, all these agreements come down to the question of the price that each side can set for its willingness to meet each other halfway.
11. Scenarios-2025. Inertia or breakthrough:
When analyzing the possible scenarios under which events may develop, it is necessary to distinguish between two basic options.
First, the war will continue in its current format and the situation on the front will not change fundamentally (the Russians will slowly advance, but without strategic breakthroughs, and perhaps even stop over time).
The second is that the situation at the front will change dramatically in favor of Ukraine or Russia. This is possible either in the event of the beginning of internal processes of collapse of the state apparatus and the army of one of the warring countries. Or in the event that one of the armies makes a sharp leap in combat technologies, and its opponent does not keep up with it. For example, in terms of the use of robotic systems and artificial intelligence. However, the experience of the previous almost three years of war shows that neither side, even if it broke ahead at some point in terms of innovation, can hold the palm for a long time, since the opponent very quickly adopts know-how. This is explained by the approximate equality of potentials. The West provides assistance to Ukraine. And indirectly, China, the technological and industrial world champion, provides assistance to Russia. In addition, both Ukraine and the Russian Federation are actively developing their own military technologies and production.
If the situation on the front changes dramatically, it will bring one of the parties (in whose favor it has changed) closer to realizing its maximum objectives. For Russia, this is the fulfillment of Putin's June conditions (possibly in an even more stringent format) and the "reset" of the Ukrainian state. For Kyiv, this is the consent of the Russian Federation to Ukraine's membership in NATO and the return of at least part of the captured territories.
12. Scenarios-2025. The Great Compromise Option:
If the war continues more or less in its current format (inertial scenario), then there are two options.
The first is ending the war on compromise terms. In this case, the most realistic scenario is "armed neutrality" of Ukraine. That is, the war stops along the front line, Ukraine does not join NATO (but joins the European Union), and foreign troops are not brought into the country. But at the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not reduced. The absence of restrictions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is, in fact, the main "red line" for Ukraine and the only real guarantee that the Russian Federation will not attack again (in conditions when the West is not ready to accept Ukraine into NATO, or send its troops as peacekeepers without Moscow's consent, or assume any obligations that imply entering a war against the Russian Federation in the event of its new invasion of Ukraine). Other conditions. Domestic policy issues (language, church), sanctions against the Russian Federation, etc. - can be discussed. As well as the form of fixing the agreements. A truce or a full-fledged peace treaty (Russia demands the conclusion of the latter, and although Ukraine de facto opposes it, this option is not 100% excluded, since it gives both parties additional guarantees that the war will not resume in the near future, and the "suspended" post-war situation is much more dangerous for Ukraine than for Russia, since few will invest money in the country, knowing that a new war with its largest neighbor can start at any moment). As for the bridgehead in the Kursk region, then, under any version of compromise peace agreements, Ukraine will most likely have to leave it. They often talk about Kyiv's desire to exchange this bridgehead for some part of the Ukrainian territories captured by Russia (for example, Energodar and Zaporizhzhya NPP), but given the current situation on the front, this is unrealistic. The bridgehead in the Kursk region is small. Russia has already returned part of it and the Russian army has the military capabilities to take it completely. It is only a question of time. Therefore, Putin is unlikely to agree to exchange for something that he can get back without any agreements.
As for relations between Ukraine and Russia after the end of the war, it is now widely believed that they will be chronically hostile. Like between South and North Korea after the Korean War. However, the experience of Georgia, which also fought with the Russian Federation and lost territory, and has now effectively restored relations with Moscow, shows that there may be different options. Although it took a lot of time for this. 16 years have passed since the 2008 war in Georgia.
13. Scenario 2025: Long War and Risks for Ukraine:
If we imagine that the peace talks will not end in anything (or even begin), while there will be no fundamental changes on the front in favor of one of the parties, and Western aid to Ukraine will continue in one volume or another (the option in which both the US and Europe immediately and completely stop supporting Ukraine is unrealistic), then the war will become "long-term".
Ukraine will be forced to lower the age of mobilization. Russia will most likely announce a new wave of mobilization. Casualties will increase, and the risks of a long war for both sides are enormous.
First of all, of course, they are huge for Ukraine. The mobilization potential is exhausted, as is the resilience of society and the army. Which is already visible now through mass evasion of service, escapes abroad and an increase in the number of AWOLs. The longer the war goes on, the stronger the apathy, the more people leave the country, the more the infrastructure is destroyed, the more cities are turned into ruins, the less habitable the country becomes, the deeper the hole of demographic and social catastrophe.
There is also a big question whether Ukraine can strategically win the war at all, since Russia, possessing nuclear weapons, can use them if it finds itself on the brink of defeat.
The biggest risk for Ukraine is its dependence on foreign support. The West is now entering a state of political turbulence, which is superimposed on economic difficulties. It is obvious that the global West will change. The situation both within the US and within the EU, as well as in relations between America and Europe, is in a zone of extreme uncertainty.
And no one can say whether, under these conditions, support for Ukraine will be maintained in the long term.
There are constant calls from the Trump camp to cut or stop aid to Kyiv. And if this happens while the war continues, it will be the worst-case scenario for Ukraine.
Also worth noting is Trump's expansionist rhetoric regarding claims to Greenland and the Panama Canal.
The basis of Ukraine's position in the current war is the principle of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. However, if this principle begins to be violated everywhere (and especially if the US sets an example in this), and constant interventions and annexations of territories become a common occurrence, then the situation with the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of part of its territory will become just one of many cases, which will significantly weaken attention to it and, accordingly, may affect the West's readiness to continue supporting Ukraine and putting pressure on Russia with sanctions. Not to mention the attitude of other countries of the world to the war.
Moreover, the question will be heard ever louder: if the US, guided by its own understanding of its national interests, wants to seize Greenland or the territory of the Panama Canal, then why can't Russia do the same with respect to Ukraine?
For Kyiv, in the current war, such a possible change in the global agenda is a potential threat of enormous proportions.
14. Scenario 2025: A Long War and Risks for Russia:
But Russia also faces very high risks of a long war.
The country is under sanctions pressure. Dependent on economic relations with countries of the global south such as China and India. Russia is also suffering heavy losses in the war. The announcement of mobilization could lead to very strong internal tension.
War constantly produces "black swans" like the recent crash of an Azerbaijani plane after a Russian air defense strike, which will suddenly create a whole range of problems.
War exacerbates all possible problems. For example, labor migration. Mobilization and recruitment of hundreds of thousands of men into the army under contract, the departure of hundreds of thousands more abroad created a very large labor shortage with high demand for it. The only way to quickly cover this shortage during the war is to attract labor migrants. And if mobilization is declared, and the war becomes long, then there will be even more migrants, and the problem will become even more acute. Even though the increase in the number of migrants is already causing tension in society.
It is also worth remembering that not long ago there was a major internal upheaval in the Russian Federation, which the authorities "slept through" - Prigozhin's mutiny. Prigozhin was promoted by a large number of Z-publics, spreading treason about the situation in the army and in the country. After the failure of the mutiny, the degree of "betrayal" in Z-publics dropped significantly, but not completely. This year, the problem again manifested itself through the spread of panic and hysteria in Z-channels around the situation in the Kursk region.
In general, this group continues to fuel all existing contradictions within the Russian Federation – between the people and the government / officials, between the rich and the poor, between those at the front and those in the rear, between Russians and Muslims, between locals and migrants, between soldiers and commanders.
Most actively, recently, it works in terms of incitement on interethnic grounds. Formally, this is presented as a fight against migration (given that this group is against ending the war, although it is the war that exacerbates the problem of migration to the greatest extent), but often comes down to inciting confrontation between Russians and Muslims. And this is an extremely dangerous topic for Russia, which can explode the situation inside the country and the army.
It is also obvious that this group enjoys the patronage of a part of the Russian leadership and special services, otherwise it would not be able to disperse "betrayal" with impunity. It is not entirely clear for what purpose this is being done. Either simply in the format of a "struggle between the Kremlin towers" for control over financial flows and influence. Or with the aim of removing Putin from power (possibly in cooperation with the West). And if the latter goal really exists, then a long war is a convenient tool for achieving it, since it exacerbates internal problems.
For now, however, the Russian state apparatus quickly suppresses any attempts at destabilization. In recent years, Moscow has been able to work on its mistakes. The economy has demonstrated very strong stability, the state system. The ability to keep the situation in the country under control. The army. To seize the initiative at the front.
And against this background, many in the Russian Federation now have euphoria and the feeling that "the final victory is already close. ".
But there was the same (and even greater) euphoria on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine and in its first days. And then it turned out that the calculation was fundamentally wrong. They did not take into account many things.
Therefore, even now, for Russia, we repeat, the key question is whether it is worth striving for maximalist goals, or whether it is more correct to record the achieved result, end the war, nullify the risks associated with it, free up resources for the development and strengthening of the state, as well as for more active work in other, more promising, geopolitical areas such as the Middle East and Africa.
In general, for both countries, a long war is a huge risk that could call into question the very existence of the two states.
15. Scenario 2025: "Red Lines", Nuclear Weapons and Risks for Peace:
But the war also poses a threat to the entire world, given that the country with the largest nuclear arsenal is participating in it. Especially since Moscow constantly hints that the war could go nuclear.
True, these hints have been coming for a long time, as have statements from the Russian Federation about the inadmissibility of crossing "red lines". And therefore many people are already skeptical about them. As if they were just words that you don't need to pay any attention to.
It is also obvious that for Russia the use of nuclear weapons is a very difficult decision with its own risks (the threat of complete international isolation or the inclusion of NATO in the war with the threat of a nuclear strike on Russia itself).
But Moscow may indeed have real "red lines" that, if crossed, it will be ready to use nuclear weapons or issue an ultimatum with a threat to use them. Such a "red line" is any situation that could lead to the defeat of the Russian Federation in a war.
And these, naturally, are not long-range strikes against the Russian Federation, the Kremlin's threats against which were to a greater extent an information campaign to actualize in Western society the fear of a nuclear war with the Russian Federation (and, in many ways, this campaign fulfilled its task).
The real "red lines" are different.
This could be the entry of NATO countries into the war in one form or another (sending troops to Ukraine, attacking Russian territory, declaring a no-fly zone over Ukraine, etc.), which would radically change the balance of power in the war not in favor of the Russian Federation.
This could be a naval blockade of Russian ports, which would paralyze Russian exports and put the Russian economy on the brink of collapse (by the way, the topic of a blockade of Russian shipping is already being discussed in the West).
Finally, this could be a situation of protracted war, in which Russia will gradually be exhausted, the risks for it will increase, and therefore the Kremlin may decide to cut the Gordian knot with one blow, threatening Ukraine and the West with a nuclear war: "either let's negotiate on our terms, or there will be a nuclear war. " And this is an extremely dangerous prospect, since both sides may hope that the enemy will bluff and, as a result, bring the matter to a nuclear conflict.
Therefore, the continuation of the war creates enormous threats not only for Ukraine and Russia, but for the entire world.
In itself, it became an example of miscalculation on all sides. Russia believed that it could quickly and with a small force take control of all of Ukraine. Ukraine and the West believed that Russia was very weak and would inevitably and quickly collapse if it started a full-scale war. Both calculations turned out to be critically wrong.
It is clear that it is difficult for anyone to admit their mistakes and even more difficult to agree on anything after rivers of spilled blood. But the longer the war goes on, the more it turns into a funnel that draws Ukraine, Russia and the entire world into new dark ages, creating colossal threats for both the warring countries and for all of humanity. And to avoid the worst, the war must end as soon as possible.
In a galaxy far, far away
The Glorious Imperial Ground Forces have captured 4,000 square kilometers in 2024 at the cost of 100 people per kilometer. Big success!
[QUOTE]Russian troops lost more than 420 thousand soldiers in 2024, advancing through the territory of Ukraine and in the Kursk region. At the same time, only 4,168 square kilometers were captured, most of which are fields and small settlements.
Along Data Institute for the Study of War (ISW), on average, Russian troops lost 102 soldiers for every square kilometer of territory they captured. The largest advance occurred between September and November 2024, when 56.5% of all territorial gains were obtained at the cost of 125,800 troops.[/QUOTE][URL]https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/voyna-rossii-protiv-ukrainy-isw-itogi-goda-2024-itogi-goda-2024-50478323.html[/URL]
It would take the Imperial Forces 2 years to conquer the rest of Donetsk Oblast under ideal conditions.
[QUOTE]Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people. Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.[/QUOTE][URL]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024[/URL]
I wonder if Russians watch too many movies.
[QUOTE]Han Solo: Just wondering what our objective is, lieutenant.
Mimban Lieutenant: Bring peace and prosperity to the galaxy, install a regime loyal to the Emperor and eradicate the hostiles.
Han Solo: It's their planet, we're the hostiles.
Mimban Lieutenant: You got a problem, trooper?
Han Solo: No problem, sir.[/QUOTE]
