Trump Putin call comes 10 years after Minsk-2 Agreement
Ukrainian POV:
They Didn't Believe Putin Would Attack. Why the Minsk Agreements, Concluded 10 Years Ago, Failed.
February 12th marks exactly 10 years since the signing of the second Minsk agreements on the settlement of the conflict in Donbas.
They included two conditions.
Ceasefire and disengagement of troops. This point has never been fully implemented, but the intensity of hostilities in Donbas has sharply decreased since February 2015 and there were no full-scale battles there until February 2022.
The political part, which implied the reintegration into Ukraine of the then uncontrolled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, granting them broad autonomy and enshrining it in the Constitution of Ukraine. The political part was not implemented, which later became one of the justifications for Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, it is difficult to find another event that currently causes such a similar reaction from the Ukrainian and Russian authorities as the Minsk agreements. Both interpret them as a grandiose deception on the part of the enemy.
Moscow claims that Kiev deliberately refused to implement the political part of the Minsk agreements, and instead rearmed the army in order to allegedly attack Donbass in 2022, so the Kremlin no longer trusts Bankova and does not need "Minsk-3", while Russian politicians and a number of "public figures" are spreading the claim in society that 10 years ago, instead of signing the Minsk agreements, the Russians should have started a "special military operation".
In Ukraine, they say that Moscow imposed disadvantageous and a priori capitulative agreements on Kiev, then spent ten years preparing for an invasion and in February 2022, having gathered its strength, attacked; and therefore there is no longer any faith in the Kremlin and "Minsk-3" cannot be acceptable.
However, in reality, the Minsk agreements of 2015 were not a prelude to war, but a real chance to avoid it.
Let's start with the Russian argument that "it was necessary to start the "SMO" a long time ago. ".
All sources indicate that in 2014, Moscow did not launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine not so much because it did not want to, but because it could not.
Firstly, for this it would have been threatened with approximately the same sanctions that followed in 2022 and which could not even be compared in significance with the sanctions for the annexation of Crimea or for the hybrid war waged in Donbas. The Russian economy of 2014 would definitely not have withstood this damage and, most likely, collapsed. Especially considering that since the fall of 2014, world oil prices began to fall.
Secondly, although the Ukrainian army was much weaker during the Anti Terrorist Operation than in 2022, the Russian Armed Forces were not distinguished by their training and skills in the coordinated conduct of large-scale military operations. Some representatives of the "DPR" in their memoirs about the events of those years indicated that the main opponents of a full-scale invasion in 2014 were the Russian military. They stated that the Russian Federation did not have enough combat-ready troops to capture such a large country as Ukraine. Russia's rapid success in Crimea, from a purely military-technical point of view, was due to the fact that Russian troops were already present on the peninsula by that time and did not need time to move forward and deploy. But along the entire length of the Russian-Ukrainian border, there were no large Russian military units at all. They began to appear only in 2015, and Moscow spent several years creating and equipping them.
As for the beginning of the fighting in Donbass in April 2014, as Russian sources stated at the time, it was an adventure not coordinated with the political leadership of the Russian Federation, organized by people of the "Orthodox oligarch" Konstantin Malofeev, which drew Russia into a war for which it was not ready. In fact, the beginning of the war in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions showed that the Kremlin would not be able to "solve the issue" with as little bloodshed as in Crimea.
In view of this, since the end of May 2014, Moscow's main line has been to exit the conflict in Donbass by granting it a special status by agreement with Kiev. This project was actively developed in June 2014. However, the then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, after some hesitation (he even declared a ceasefire in June), chose the military path to return the territories and withdrew from the ceasefire on July 1, sending the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the offensive.
The subsequent course of the conflict is well known. In August, after the introduction of a limited contingent of Russian troops into Donbass (which the Kremlin did not officially acknowledge), the Ukrainian Armed Forces suffered a series of defeats near Ilovaisk and Lugansk. Then Poroshenko was forced to agree to the first Minsk agreements. And then, after another military escalation in January-February 2015, to the second Minsk agreements.
At the same time, in the fall of 2014, interesting testimony from a Russian soldier who participated in the fighting in Donbass was published on Russian social networks. He noted that even the capture of Mariupol, not to mention a deeper advance, would have been a difficult task for the Russian army, would have led to large casualties and a complete "unmasking" of the participation of Russian troops in supporting the separatist movement in the southeast of Ukraine. Which the Kremlin leadership obviously did not want to do in those years for the reasons mentioned above.
As for the second Minsk agreements, Poroshenko agreed to them not for military reasons (despite the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the battle for Debaltseve and the Donetsk airport, the front as a whole did not collapse), but purely for economic reasons: Western countries, which did not want to spoil relations with the Russian Federation, demanded that Kiev agree to Minsk-2 as a condition for continuing financial support for Ukraine.
In general, the Minsk agreements were quite beneficial for Moscow, since they left the discussion of the Crimea issue out of the negotiations, thereby de facto recognizing its Russian status, and also allowed the Kremlin to save face by obtaining a special status for the territories of the "LDNR" within Ukraine, and subsequently withdraw from the conflict in Donbas, opening the way to lifting sanctions against Russia.
However, in the end, the political part of the Minsk agreements was not implemented. What the Russian Federation accuses Ukraine of: allegedly Kiev did not intend to fulfill these agreements, strengthening its army in order to attack Donbas again.
In reality, this was not entirely true. Yes, the Ukrainian authorities did not want to implement the political part of the agreements, which they began to talk about openly around 2017. But this did not mean that Bankova was preparing to regain control over the southeast by force. There is no evidence of this. If a military scenario was considered by Kiev, it was only with absolute guarantees that the Russians would not interfere in the new ATO (for example, in the event of some internal upheavals in the Russian Federation). But this was definitely not the situation of February 2022, when a 150,000-strong Russian army was stationed at the borders of Ukraine, and mobilization was announced in the "LDNR". In addition, according to all polls in the period 2015-2021, the overwhelming minority of Ukrainians supported the military solution to the issue of the uncontrolled territories of Donbas.
For what reasons did Kiev not want to implement the political part of the agreements and reintegrate Donbas with a special status?
These factors can be divided into tactical, caused by the domestic and foreign political situation, economic interests, and strategic.
The tactical reasons were that the Ukrainian post-Maidan authorities perceived the uncontrolled part of Donbas as a completely alien element, the integration of which into Ukraine in a special status carried enormous risks. At the same time, maintaining the current "separatist" status quo promised, according to Kiev's logic at the time, great benefits: firstly, the constant maintenance of military tension in Donbas made it possible to attract the attention of the West to this problem and created an obstacle to the process of normalizing its relations with the Russian Federation, and also provided arguments for continuing Western financial support for Ukraine through the IMF and other structures; secondly, the situation when "there is no war, although there is a war", established in Donbass from 2015 to 2021, allowed the Ukrainian authorities to extract both political (maintaining tension in society due to the fact that the country is in a state of war and has an external enemy, the opportunity to stigmatize as accomplices of the enemy all those who destabilize the situation inside the country) and economic (development of military budgets) dividends. At the same time, there was no threat of large-scale military actions with a large number of victims and the threat of new losses of territory.
But the main reason why the Ukrainian authorities under Poroshenko and Zelensky did not want to implement the political part of "Minsk" was different.
Kiev did not believe that failure to implement the Minsk agreements and the continuation of the unresolved conflict in the southeast would lead to the beginning of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the head of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. They also believed that the collective West would not allow this. And they also believed that if Putin suddenly decided to attack, the US and the EU would quickly find ways to "put him on his shoulder blades", forcing him to capitulate. Thus, according to the conviction of the Ukrainian authorities, the conflict in Donbas could continue to be maintained in a sluggish mode, without a transition to intensive military action, and then in some future the Russian Federation would either annex the uncontrolled territories, or, for the sake of restoring relations with the West and lifting sanctions, would simply give the "LDNR" to Ukraine without any special conditions.
It was this conviction that was the basis that determined the policy of the Ukrainian authorities towards Donbas until 2022. Moreover, the conviction was so strong that even shortly before the invasion on Bankova, many declared that the concentration of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine was Putin's bluff and in reality the matter would be limited to the annexation of the "LDNR", which Zelensky's office even expected with some relief, since this would bury the Minsk agreements, which they disliked.
Let us now turn to Kiev's arguments that the implementation of the political part of the Minsk agreements would be capitulation. They are well known. The logistics of the 2015 agreements envisaged holding elections to local authorities in "certain areas" of Ukraine before the transfer of control over the border to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Under such conditions, pro-Russian forces would have clearly won. Control over the border would have begun to be transferred only the day after the elections, and would have been fully completed only after the special status of Donbass was included in the Constitution, with "certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions" receiving very broad autonomy rights. In particular, the armed formations of the "LDNR" would have been legalized there under the guise of a "people's militia. ".
Thus, according to opponents of "Minsk-2", the implementation of its political part would have led to the emergence of a self-governing enclave within Ukraine that would be strictly oriented toward Moscow, through which the Russians would undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and block Kiev's European course.
But this point of view was not the only one – in the Ukrainian elite there were also supporters of implementing the political part of "Minsk". Their arguments are presented below.
After the integration of the uncontrolled territories into Ukraine, whoever was elected to the authorities, they would have found themselves in the legal field of Ukraine one way or another. They would have entered Ukrainian political and economic life, quickly mastered corruption schemes, thanks to which life in Ukraine would have become much more attractive for local leaders than under the strict control of the Kremlin and the FSB. Also, Western partners would have quickly established their ties with them, would have allocated funds for the reintegration and restoration of Donbass, from which the "leaders of individual regions" would have systematically begun to feed themselves. Not to mention the influence and investments of Rinat Akhmetov and other prominent representatives of the "old Donetsk" elites. Soon after visiting the American embassy in Kyiv, as well as Washington, Brussels and Berlin, the leaders of the autonomous regions of Donbass would have suddenly begun to forget the numbers of their Moscow curators. Of course, they would not have given up their rights to self-government, nor would they have given up slogans in defense of the Russian language, against NATO and for friendship with Russia, but the real control over them by the Kremlin and Russian special services would have been cut off very quickly, since no one would have wanted to return from the free-and-corrupt Ukrainian bread to the rigid vertical of Moscow curators. At the same time, signals came from the Russian Federation in 2015-2016 that they would not have prevented such a development of events, since the implementation of the Minsk agreements in Moscow was perceived as a way out of the conflict with Kiev while saving face and with a view to lifting Western sanctions. And what would happen next with the "separate regions" was of little concern to anyone. Thus, having fulfilled the political part of the Minsk agreements, Kyiv would not only fully restore control over Donbass, but would also restore relations with the Russian Federation, minimizing the likelihood of war.
However, the point of view of the supporters of the implementation of the political part did not become dominant. With the support of the Western "war party", another position won, according to which Kyiv needs to block the implementation of "Minsk-2", while receiving domestic and foreign policy dividends and preventing the restoration of relations between the Russian Federation and the West.
The main motive, we repeat, was the conviction of the Ukrainian elites that Putin would not dare to attack Ukraine and the West would not allow it.
Already after the start of the full-scale invasion, some representatives of the former Ukrainian government admitted: if they had known that Putin would start a war and the West would not be able to stop him or destroy Russia with sanctions, they would not have slowed down, but, on the contrary, forced the implementation of the political part of Minsk and the reintegration of Donbass into Ukraine.
But what happened, happened.
And now the Minsk agreements of 10 years ago have been completely rejected and forgotten by the Ukrainian and Russian authorities. And the phrase "we do not need Minsk-3" is regularly repeated by both sides. Especially by supporters of war to a victorious end, who demand to fight until the complete capitulation of the enemy.
Nevertheless, this option for resolving the conflict is not the only one.
It is quite possible that the war will have to be ended on the basis of some kind of compromise. This is exactly what politicians are currently discussing at the initiative of the new US President Donald Trump, who is calling for a rapid ceasefire in Ukraine.
At the same time, both Kiev and Moscow insist on their own conditions, appealing, again, to the sad "Minsk" experience. The Ukrainian authorities, convinced of the fallacy of counting on the fact that Putin will not dare to attack, are demanding security guarantees from the West, implying the entry of allies into the war with the Russian Federation in the event of a possible new invasion. Either in the form of Kiev's admission to NATO, or the deployment of Western troops on Ukrainian territory (both of which seem extremely unlikely at the moment, including due to the Kremlin's harshly negative position). Moscow insists not just on concluding a truce, as was the case 10 years ago, but on a full-fledged broad peace treaty with legal fixation of all agreements, including Ukraine's recognition of the "new borders"; on changes in Ukraine's domestic policy (Kyiv is categorically against all of this), as well as on the lifting of Western sanctions against the Russian Federation.
It is still unknown whether it will be possible to reach a compromise on these positions, and if so, what kind.
However, the main question is different: even if the parties reach an agreement and the hot phase of the war ends, how will relations between Ukraine and Russia be built in the future? Will both countries strive for peaceful and non-hostile coexistence with each other, or will they set as their goal the creation of permanent mutual problems in the hope of at some point conducting a revenge battle with the subsequent capitulation of the enemy?
In the second case, no matter what agreements are concluded, they will most likely share the fate of the Minsk agreements, becoming only a respite before a new war or a series of armed conflicts. And many now think that this is exactly what will happen.
The chances that escalation can be avoided in the future will appear if conclusions are drawn from the experience of the last ten years. And especially from the erroneous calculations of both sides on the eve of 2022. Kiev has become convinced that the West is not ready to harshly oppose Moscow's military aggression and is even less ready to enter into a direct war with the Russian Federation for Ukraine, when the country has been in a state of bloody and destructive war with colossal losses for almost three years. Moscow has become convinced that the war with Ukraine was not an easy walk, having brought great sacrifices and risks for the future of the Russian Federation itself.
Of course, we can repeat this sad experience over and over again, year after year, which one day will become fatal for one of the parties, and it is possible that for both. But we can also put an end to this terrible destructive war together, each going their own way, without interfering with each other's lives. Put an end to what could have been put 10 years ago.
Trump'Business with Netenyahu and Putin!
On a Sunday few articles below make interesting reading on tricky subjects.
The first one on the relationship between Trump and Putin!
Ex-intelligence chiefs believe Trump is an unwitting agent of Putin. Here's why;. [URL]https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/13/trump-putin-secret-kgb-agent/[/URL].
Trump' s Business with Netanyaho, F*ck him': Trump rages at Netanyahu, claims he saved Israel from destruction [URL]https://www.timesofisrael.com/fck-him-in-interview-trump-rages-at-netanyahu-over-congratulations-to-bi[/URL].
US president-elect shares without comment a video on Truth Social of Columbia's Jeffrey Sachs calling PM a 'deep, dark son of a *****' and saying he's gotten US into 'endless wars'.
[URL]https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-posts-clip-of-prof-calling-netanyahu-obsessive-about-getting-us-to-fight-iran/[/URL]
Here is what Russia has really gained in Ukraine since 2022.
This animated map clearly shows the pathetic territorial gains Russia has achieved since September 2022 having paid for them in 300,000 lives and depleted military equipment. You really must pay attention while watching to register those tiny pathetic movements.
3 years of war, and they haven't even taken Donbas.
Kyiv in three days, aha!
[URL]https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x9e6bzo[/URL]
Don't know about unwitting.
[QUOTE=Jojosun;2983383]On a Sunday few articles below make interesting reading on tricky subjects.
The first one on the relationship between Trump and Putin!
Ex-intelligence chiefs believe Trump is an unwitting agent of Putin. Here's why;. [URL]https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/13/trump-putin-secret-kgb-agent/[/URL].[/QUOTE]This article lacks depth, and I don't buy it. In the KGB times if you're a person of interest, they won't just flatter you. They wouldn't groom you for decades. They would always look for a way to lock you in. It could be a video-recorded bribe or statutory rape (KGB especially loved these two because these are easy to set up and document). If KGB had gotten interested in Trump in the Soviet times, this is how they would've proceeded. That means, it's entirely possible that somewhere in Lubyanka archives there is a folder with his name on the cover and signature inside.
Basically, I don't believe he's unwitting, unless they decided he was too undisciplined and wasn't worth the effort. That's also a possibility.
But unwitting or not, anyone who's been watching the Orange for the last 10 years simply can't have any doubts as to where his loyalties are.
Game is over, its official
Waffle on. It was always going to end along these lines.
Ukraine was a paper state from 1991 run by a series of crooks lining their pockets. The grifters in Washington saw a chance to make big $ and ran with it, letting the usual useful idiots putting up flags etc and the usual shrill talk of democracy, apple pie and motherhood as Hunter Biden sniffed cocaine with underage hookers. And Biden gave himself and family and other cronies pardons in advance. Nearly as corrupt as the Clinton's. You should watch "Wag the Dog" (1997) with De Niro. I see Germany's Merkle admitted the Minsk accords were bullshit paper the whole time.
End result: NATO is out. Ukraine is going to lose territory and have to sell minerals, agriculture and the virginity of its women. Zelinsky and his buddies will slink off the lake Como or wherever with a few hundred million, each, and prolly a book deal to boot, and plenty of hot young women till he dies of old age, pampered and protected with the coin of whichever western country he retires to. He did well as a stand up comic. Who also banned elections when democracy did not suit. So typical. And the fawning press singing as a choir.
As for the people, catastrophic damage to property, maiming of body and mind of a generation and total loss of confidence and mass migration.
I only wish I could invest in Trump companies and those owed by the Netanyahu family. You can't get a better deal than free prime land cleaned up and paid for Uncle Sam and the profits privatized. Maybe that's the plan for Ukraine as well.
Why not stick to something you know or educate yourself on the subject matter?
[QUOTE=PahllusMaximus;2983523]Waffle on. It was always going to end along these lines.
Ukraine was a paper state from 1991 run by a series of crooks lining their pockets. [/QUOTE]Really? No kidding!
What exactly is a paper state and how is it different from a real state?
What exactly is your area of expertise regarding Ukraine?
Why do you hate this country and its democratically elected leaders so much?
Why do you revere bloody tyrant and mass murderer Putin? No, seriously, please explain it to me: why does every MAGA kook in this country adore that bloodthirsty * and internationally recognized war criminal? What's the appeal?
You know why I enjoy your posts about Rio. Because you know Rio. When you know something about something it shows right away.
And when you don't know a dick about the country, the conflict and the history and dynamics of the conflict, and yet you're trying to extend your 2 hryvnas no one's asked you about, it shows too. It also shows how in order to compensate for your ignorance you "borrow" "ideas" from Russia state propagandists and useful idiots in this very thread.
Sad!