Stupid Shit in Kyiv

[Paulie97]

I used two stats to refute your bullshit notion Russia is going broke....Yeah, Elvis, but Putin is going down any day now.

Some things never change.

https://www.logical-fallacy.com/articles/strawman/

P.S. Economic analysis is usually more complicated than two stats, especially if they have happen to be cherrypicked off Russian state media. Maybe they aren't, but feel free to cite your source. I just posted an interesting article.

Tiny, safe travels and have fun.

[Paulie97]

Right Elvis. Paulie's article from the war-promotion institute was hugely and intentionally deceiving. To use his word, it was propaganda.

If the Russian government were to take debt as a % of GDP up from the current level around 12% or 15% to 50%, which would still be low compared to many other countries, it could raise a lot of money for defense. As it could by increasing the income tax rate. And while Russia's defense expenditures as a % of total government expenditures are high, they're still very manageable in relation to the size of the economy.

Indeed, as you say, anyone who believes Russia's going bankrupt isn't "drinking from the well of reality. ".

I don't believe anyone is arguing that Russia will go bankrupt, but their economic challenges are significant. Call it a personal preference, but I'd rather listen to ISW or this guy than you or Elvis. Both of you are big on pontificating, the latter big on bluster, and neither of you has a propensity toward source citations. While it's more than laughable when you guys complain about bias. LOL.

Russia's Economic Gamble: The Hidden Costs of War-Driven Growth.

The storm of government spending is sustaining the current state of affairs, but it cannot address the chronic problems that have long plagued the Russian economy. We are witnessing an irreversible turn toward economic stagnation.

By Alexandra Prokopenko.

Published on December 20,2024.

"Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian economy has repeatedly defied expectations. Predictions of a double-digit contraction never materialized. On the contrary, GDP grew by 3. 6 percent in 2023 and an expected 4 percent in 2024: rates that both developed and developing nations might envy. Key indicators like GDP growth, household income, and low unemployment have become President Vladimir Putin's trump cards. He brandishes them to the West as proof that sanctions are ineffective, and presents them to partners in Asia and Africa as evidence of Russia's sound economic policies and the resilience of its development model. Chinese officials are apparently convinced, having reportedly established an interagency commission to study Russia's economic model.

Yet this image of resilience is deceptive. Over the past two years, Russia's economy has operated like a marathoner on fiscal steroids—and now those steroids are wearing off. Growth is slowing, key sectors are cooling, and the arguments underpinning Putin's claims of economic "invulnerability" are unraveling. The Kremlin faces the mounting challenge of sustaining the war effort and funding social and infrastructure programs. Simultaneously maintaining low inflation and a stable ruble is proving increasingly unsustainable. Without significant course corrections, the current momentum may falter within a year. By 2026–2027, the fiscal and social challenges now on the horizon could fully metastasize into a crisis.

Since the invasion, Russia's economy has relied on a unique combination of factors: record hydrocarbon export revenues, a market-oriented economic structure, a robust banking system, strict centralized governance, and a lack of public consensus requirements. Such conditions are exceptional, even among authoritarian regimes, making the Kremlin's economic model an anomaly rather than a replicable template for success. The foundations of this strategy are showing signs of erosion. The question is not if the cracks will spread, but how—and when—they will fundamentally reshape the Kremlin's capacity to project power and maintain internal stability.

Steam Without Substance.

The rapid expansion of government spending—both direct budgetary outlays and state-subsidized loan programs—has been the primary driver of Russia's recent economic growth. From 2022 to 2024, the fiscal stimulus amounted to over 10 percent of GDP, while preferential loan portfolios in the banking sector surpassed 15 trillion rubles ($150 billion). This extraordinary expenditure has turned the military-industrial complex into the main engine of economic expansion. Yet cracks are becoming visible. By the third quarter of 2024, GDP growth had slowed to 3. 1 percent, down from 4. 1 percent in the previous quarter. While industries linked to defense production continue to grow, their pace is far below last year's levels. Other sectors are faltering: extractive industries face declining production due to lower hydrocarbon export prices and OPEC+ production cuts, while agriculture has also lost momentum. Retail trade remains a rare bright spot, buoyed by consumer spending. However, surveys point to slowing business activity and rising inflation expectations among both businesses and households.

The limits of Russia's production capacity are stark. Industrial facilities are operating at 81 percent of capacity, and 73 percent of enterprises report labor shortages. Unemployment has hit a record low of 2. 3 percent, leaving an estimated 1. 6 million jobs unfilled. In practical terms, the domestic economy cannot meet the demand driven by aggressive state and household spending, necessitating greater reliance on imports. This, in turn, increases demand for foreign currency, putting downward pressure on the ruble and fueling inflation.

Businesses are under growing strain. Falling global prices for coal and metals, combined with sanctions, have plunged the coal sector into real losses for the first time since 2020. This sector employs 650,000 people across thirty-one single-industry towns, where the shutdown of a single enterprise can paralyze an entire community, making its members prime candidates for government support. But other struggling industries—automotive manufacturing, non-food retail, and housing construction—are also lining up for state assistance. Resources are stretched thin as stagnant oil and gas revenues, coupled with energy sanctions, limit budgetary inflows. While tax revenues have temporarily offset falling hydrocarbon income, they are consumed by current expenditures, leaving no surplus. By November 2024, the liquid portion of the National Wealth Fund stood at just $31 billion, its lowest level since the fund's inception in 2008. That reserve is insufficient to meet growing demand.

At the same time, tight labor markets are driving wages higher, squeezing business profitability. Wage growth is most pronounced in industrial regions. The Kurgan region, home to Russia's sole producer of armored personnel carriers, has seen salaries jump by 33 percent. The Volga and Ural regions, hubs for defense manufacturing, are close behind. However, this uneven wage growth is exacerbating regional inequality, a long-standing challenge that has only deepened since the war began.

Labor shortages remain a persistent bottleneck. For unskilled roles, Central Asian migrants could help fill the gap, but rising xenophobia—now entrenched in legislation—is curtailing immigration. In any case, Central Asian nations cannot provide all the trained professionals Russia requires. Moscow's failure to invest in workforce development across the post-Soviet space has compounded the problem, leaving Russian industries ill-equipped to meet current demand.

The greatest losers in this overheated economy are Putin's core supporters: public sector workers, including teachers, doctors, law enforcement personnel, and pensioners. Their wages and benefits are tied to official inflation rates of 9 percent, but real inflation for many households exceeds 20 percent. Meanwhile, the central bank has delayed its target of returning inflation to 4 percent, pushing it back to mid-2026 as Kremlin spending priorities crowd out monetary policy objectives.

Firepower Supremacy.

As 2025 looms, the Kremlin remains steadfast in prioritizing war, despite its ever-mounting costs. For the third consecutive year, military expenditure dominates the federal budget, but a unique aspect of this year is the near-exclusive allocation of additional state revenues to defense—at the expense of all other sectors. Defense and security spending will exceed 8 percent of GDP and account for 40 percent of total federal expenditure, a record not seen since the Soviet Union's Cold War era. These funds are directed primarily toward two areas: arms production and military salaries.

The results of these investments are striking. Russia has doubled its production of armored vehicles and increased ammunition output fivefold at certain facilities. A new sector—mass production of military drones—has emerged, while funding for civilian drone programs has been slashed tenfold.

A significant portion of this budget supports Russia's burgeoning force of contract soldiers. With the army requiring 20,000 to 30,000 new recruits monthly, the Kremlin relies heavily on financial incentives to attract men to the front. Average enlistment bonuses, supplemented by regional allowances, now stand at 1. 1 million rubles ($11,000), with annual incomes ranging from 3. 5 million to 5. 5 million rubles ($34,000–53,000), depending on region and unit. These payouts place a heavy burden on regional budgets, with bonuses reaching as high as 2 million rubles ($19,000) in Moscow and 3 million rubles ($29,000) in the Belgorod region on the border with Ukraine. Such inflated sums reflect the shrinking pool of willing recruits, which is forcing authorities to offer additional incentives, such as debt forgiveness, university admission perks, and healthcare benefits for soldiers' families. Direct federal spending on new recruits alone is estimated at 1. 6–2. 4 trillion rubles ($16–23 billion), not including additional costs for wounded soldiers and compensation for families of the deceased—figures obscured by classified statistics.

Although the federal budget outlines modest reductions in defense spending for 2026–2027, military expenditure will remain elevated even if the war in Ukraine ends in 2025. Replenishing depleted arsenals will be costly, especially as inflation drives up production costs. Moreover, the entrenched military-industrial sector, sustained by generous state subsidies, is unlikely to accept cuts without resistance. NATO's expanding defense budgets provide further justification for Putin to maintain high military spending.

Meanwhile, "non-defense" budgetary allocations are stagnating or shrinking in real terms. Social services, national economic programs, and even internal security and law enforcement face funding cuts. Chronic underfunding and personnel shortages in Russia's Interior Ministry and Federal Penitentiary Service are expected to worsen. Increased tax revenues—up 73 percent in 2025 due to higher levies on businesses and households—are being funneled almost entirely toward military needs, leaving little for other sectors. The resulting imbalance will further drain the civilian economy, slowing growth and exacerbating social inequalities.

When the active phase of the war ends, spending on soldiers will be among the first to face cuts. With over 3 million people, including their families, directly affected by military service, reductions in benefits and income will impact a significant portion of the population. Sustaining long-term support for this group will be beyond the Kremlin's means, while withdrawing support for veterans is a risky business.

The massive payouts to soldiers and the broader surge in wages have created a paradoxical situation. While economic inequality has deepened, many Russians feel their standard of living has improved. Surveys indicate growing perceptions of a fairer distribution of income, with over 40 percent of respondents openly rejecting the need for personal freedoms or human rights, instead equating dignity with state-provided salaries and pensions. This sentiment may prove temporary, as inflation erodes the gains of war beneficiaries. But if it persists, it could cement a dangerous narrative: the association of Putin's wartime leadership with prosperity and economic growth, and peace with decline and humiliation.

When the war ends, the challenges will fall to Putin's successors. They will inherit an economy burdened by structural imbalances and a public disinclined toward sacrifice or reform. Businesses, too, will look back fondly on wartime "expanded demand" and the exodus of competitors, which left market gaps and undervalued assets in their wake. Yet the reckoning for today's policies will come, leaving a fractured economy in which the much-vaunted macroeconomic stability of prewar Russia has already been sacrificed on the altar of conflict.

Russia's Economic Tightrope.

Two critical indicators highlight the instability of Russia's economy: inflation, which has reached almost 9 percent since the beginning of 2024, and a key interest rate of 21 percent, which so far has done little to temper price growth.

The surge in inflation is fueled by domestic demand, primarily driven by state spending and rising wages among Russians. Domestic production struggles to meet this demand, necessitating higher imports and, consequently, increased reliance on foreign currency. This dynamic has weakened the ruble, which in late November suffered its sharpest drop, falling nearly 25 percent from its summer 2022 peak.

The government's options to stabilize the ruble are limited. Half of Russia's foreign exchange reserves remain frozen due to sanctions, while the remainder is reserved for potential threats to financial stability. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund are negligible, and with the key interest rate already at its peak, further hikes are unlikely. Compounding the challenge is the absence of foreign investors since 2022 and the capital controls introduced in 2023, which have undermined the effectiveness of monetary policy as a tool for exchange rate stabilization.

This situation exposes the structural constraints imposed by sanctions and the resource-based nature of Russia's economy. No significant increase in foreign currency earnings is anticipated, as export volumes are constrained by geography—primarily shipments to China, India, and other Asian nations—and by sanctions, which have inflated operational costs for logistics and cross-border transactions. The surplus in the current account is being consumed by rising expenditures, while the growing import dependency exacerbates the ruble's weakness and, in turn, inflation.

Business profitability is further eroded by rising costs: increased tariffs on rail transport, electricity, and gas, as well as higher logistics expenses and the expanding scope of sanctions. As a result, resource exports are nearing their limits; opportunities for technological exports are negligible; and productivity growth is stifled by sanctions.

External assistance seems unlikely. Despite its substantial trade relationship with Russia, China has shown little urgency in stepping into the role of a technological partner. For the Kremlin, this leaves the economy precariously balanced, with no clear pathway out of its structural vulnerabilities.

The Authoritarian Dividend.

The structure of Russia's market economy is steadily losing its flexibility under the weight of war and a centralized decisionmaking system that prioritizes control over dynamism. Subsidized sectors of the economy, insulated from interest rate fluctuations, are expanding rapidly. Beyond the military-industrial complex and its affiliates, preferential loans now underpin agriculture and real estate development as well. Meanwhile, the high key interest rate has significantly reduced corporate profits by driving up borrowing costs. Companies with heavy debt burdens face a dramatically increased risk of bankruptcy. Simultaneously, the Kremlin and the government are embracing a dirigiste approach to fiscal and monetary policy, increasingly dictating economic outcomes from above.

In Putin's Russia, administrative costs for implementing policy decisions are remarkably low. Without public debate or opposition, the government can impose new taxes on individuals and businesses with minimal resistance. The public does not protest, and lawmakers in the State Duma vote as instructed. Major resource companies have already been subjected to extraordinary profit levies, such as Gazprom in 2022 and Transneft in 2024. Fertilizer producers, still active in global markets and largely untouched by sanctions, are likely next in line.

Consensus within the government's economic bloc is not required; Putin alone determines the course of action. However, this centralized system carries hidden costs. The proliferation of emergency measures disrupts conventional management practices. Ad hoc decisions are becoming the norm, even in areas where institutional solutions could suffice. Policies increasingly prioritize immediate gains over long-term strategy. Complex, forward-looking initiatives are sidelined in favor of quick fixes. The lack of reliable information due to censorship and selective reporting undermines decision making at all levels of governance, including in the highest echelons of bureaucracy.

The Kremlin has amplified these shortcomings by constructing a synthetic reality, particularly in response to sanctions. The government meticulously avoids highlighting disruptions to daily life, instead projecting an image of "business as usual"—or even improvement. For instance, the authorities have stopped publishing critical economic data, including figures on foreign trade, oil production and exports, and the financial health of banks and corporations.

This suppression of data extends beyond analysts and the public. Bureaucrats themselves face restricted access to accurate information, leading to sanitized reports that omit inconvenient truths. Over time, this fabricated narrative becomes the basis for governance. Far from a mere oversight, this distortion is a deliberate feature of Putin's authoritarian system. While it offers short-term tactical advantages, it systematically erodes the foundations for sustainable growth and stability.

Despite revenue shortfalls, the 2025 federal budget includes a litany of extravagant projects, such as the construction of a high-speed rail link between Moscow and St. Petersburg and increased funding for import substitution in aviation. These initiatives suggest a government still behaving as though the economy is on steroids, even as the stimulative effects have largely dissipated.

The Post-2025 Future.

Russia's economic future beyond 2025 looks troubling. On the surface, economic growth and low unemployment create an illusion of stability for the country's new economic model. However, this model is already confronting three fundamental limitations: a shortage of labor, exhausted production capacities, and stagnating export revenues due to sanctions. The storm of government spending is sustaining the current state of affairs, but it cannot address the chronic problems that have long plagued the Russian economy. The sanctions regime—partially mitigated by China, India, and other Asian countries—only serves to reinforce these old ailments. The transactional costs associated with sanctions weigh heavily on the entire economy.

Each passing month intensifies the pressure. The Kremlin is approaching a tipping point when the social contract between the state and the people will inevitably shift. Russians are increasingly being asked to accept rising inequality and a decline in quality of life in exchange for short-term stability and symbolic pride in the idea of a "fortress nation. " But even this compromise is becoming less and less sustainable.

A sudden collapse akin to the 1990's is unlikely: the government still has the resources to maintain a minimum level of order and control. However, we are already witnessing a largely irreversible turn toward economic stagnation. Continued reliance on the military sector and a mobilization-driven model will trap Russia in a "stagnation trap" characterized by low growth and chronic internal imbalances. ".

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia...ulties?lang=en

[Elvis 2008]

Lying about Russia, lying about the war, and preventing the West and the Ukraine from falling prostrate and surrendering. Wink Wink Nonetheless this is a good article, hot off the press that deserves it's own place in the sun. There's some interesting imbedded links. Just look for the underlines in the original source, which for whatever reason didn't carry over in the copy and paste. But hey, regardless, maybe this will encourage BR, Tiny, and Elvis to link us over to Russian state media more often. Source citations show respect and consideration to the readers.

I used two stats to refute your bullshit notion Russia is going broke: tax rate and debt to GDP ratio. If you had a shred of self respect, you would refute those numbers. Instead you lie and insult when you are wrong as you always do.

What gets me about you dumb Democratic douches is how you advocate against your own self interests. Obviously, two great mongering locals were taken off line.

Then there is the water and natural gas pipelines that could have been built if the money had been used there versus in Ukraine. That water pipeline would have come in handy with the California fires.

Then there is oil and gas prices and blowing up Nordstream. The Germans do not have cheap natural gas so their economy goes takes a hit. It is economics 101. You take Russian oil and gas off line and energy prices have to go up. So all but the biggest world's energy producers take a big hit for that.

But the worst were fertilizer costs. Half the world's fertilizer comes from Russia and Belarus. Fertilizer and food prices skyrocketed. If there were shit harvests in 2022 through 2024, people would have literally starved to death. Enough fertilizer has come on line now that prices look to be stabilizing, but it was a huge risk.

And with all this inflation, the liberals are not only voted out in the USA and Canada but international polling for liberalism is at its lowest point in decades. Europe is already revolting against leftist polices and parties.

And this is not even including all the dead bodies piling up. You know you are in a cult when all this shit is going on all around you and you ignore it and say. Yeah, Elvis, but Putin is going down any day now. And? Why is your life going to get better because of that? What if the new guy is even worse?

And that is why it is so easy to make fun of Democratic dumbshit douches. In many cases, the people they hurt the most is themselves.

[Sirioja]

Here is a perfect example of another prosperous debtless country.

I wonder why it didn't stop Ceausescu from getting deposed and shot in the back of his head.

Ceaucescu and his wife were dictator, like Putin. Their citizens were / are fucked by them. Maybe Putin will finish in same way, if Russians wake up, when they are so blind.

[Tiny 12]

Here is a perfect example of another prosperous debtless country.

I wonder why it didn't stop Ceausescu from getting deposed and shot in the back of his head.

Putin has a whole lot higher approval rating than Ceausescu did. An article in the Financial Times the other day about the president of El Salvador showed Putin as having the second highest approval rating of world leaders. That may be overstating it, but the FT doesn't usually throw out garbage, even when it comes from outside sources.

I'll be traveling so no posts for a while. I hope Russia and Ukraine will be on a path to piece when I'm back.

[Sirioja]

The one thing I will agree with you is that Russians and Ukrainians are indeed Brothers and it's such a tragedy that this NATO expansion bullshit pushed them to fight each other. I hope there will be a reconciliation after the war is over when the people of Ukraine will realize that the collective west took them down the primrose path and really doesn't give 2 shits about them. That in my opinion is inevitable.

I also wish for this new year this war and also in Gaza will stop, but war in Ukraine is only because of Putin craziness, when nobody wanted to attack Russia, but Putin just dream about ex USSR again. Trump failed to stop war in Ukraine, as he did bullshit like always.

[Xpartan]

Here is a perfect example of another prosperous debtless country.

I wonder why it didn't stop Ceausescu from getting deposed and shot in the back of his head.

[Blood Red]

Could somebody please explain "whataboutism" to me? Does it mean one set of rules applies to Russia and a different set to the USA and the rest of the West? Or does it mean, "It's different this time, because I say so. ".

Yes, pretty much. It is the new Rules Based International Order of the United States and the collective west.

Ex: they can change Serbia's borders by force in the heart of Europe but Russia can't with Crimea and now with Ukraine. It is hypocrisy in its extreme. It is okay for Israelis to slaughter the Palestinians and turn Gaza to Rubble and commit a Genocide, yet it's an atrocity and an enormous crime what is happening in Ukraine where far less civilians have died. These people are disgusting but the good thing is that they are being exposed now.

[Blood Red]

Ukrainians are exhausted, but the world now know Russian army is weak, they can t anymore build military ships without Ukrainian factories and they have less and less money for keeping on this war only due to Putin craziness, when Russians and Ukrainians are so much brothers with so many mixed families, Russians being bullshiting fucked by shameful Putin. Russians could live much better without Putin who fuck their freedom.

The one thing I will agree with you is that Russians and Ukrainians are indeed Brothers and it's such a tragedy that this NATO expansion bullshit pushed them to fight each other. I hope there will be a reconciliation after the war is over when the people of Ukraine will realize that the collective west took them down the primrose path and really doesn't give 2 shits about them. That in my opinion is inevitable.

[Elvis 2008]

Could somebody please explain "whataboutism" to me? Does it mean one set of rules applies to Russia and a different set to the USA and the rest of the West? Or does it mean, "It's different this time, because I say so. ".

So look at this comedic video of Biden: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dADyPBHeOg.

How do you defend this? It literally is as honest about Biden's condition as there was.

The Democratic douche response to this was a 5 or 10 second clip of Trump stuttering with the question: What about Trump?

The point of whatboutism is that you do not defend your POV. You attack your opponent's POV as equal or worse.

But anyone who saw the debate between Trump and Biden knew this strategy fell on its face.

I actually thought Biden was more alert during the debate than at other times. No doubt he was filled with drugs then though.

In fact, if Biden were asked why he did not call and speak to Putin, I am not joking when I think Biden would say, "I did. I called him hundreds of times. ".

I personally think Dems use whataboutism tactics 10 X more often than Republicans do while claiming to be victims of whataboutism about 10 X more as well.

[Paulie97]

Russia seems to be doing so great according to your data. It appears the war it started and the sanctions from those Democratic douches are greatly contributing to its economy.

Maybe you shouldn't so vehemently insist on peace talks, considering this amazing economic miracle. Let's give Russia a chance to do even better, eh?

Why not wait until Russia completely overtakes the US and China as two leading world economies?

Which is about to occur any time now per your diligent research.

That sums it well, and concisely.

[Tiny 12]

LOL. I have not made my own projections. I have just been making fun of how dumb yours have been. But yeah, maybe I should make my own. Here goes:

What does it take to bankrupt Russia? The most common method used to assess a nation's chance of defaulting is debt to GDP ratio. Russia's ratio is 15%. In layman's term, that is like saying someone is making $100,000 per year and has $15,000 in debt. So Russian income may not go up as much as projected? Big fucking deal. Russian GDP could go down 10% and Russia would still have no problem paying down their debt.

Of course, GDP is not the real picture because it is what the government can collect in taxes that matters. Thing is in Russia as of January 2025, the personal income tax rate in Russia stands at 13% for the majority of residents, with some higher earners paying a rate of 15%. So Putin has plenty of leeway with raising the tax rates if he needed to get higher government income.

If you look at income tax rates and debt in the West, there is much, much less wiggle room.

In relative terms, if Russia has $15,000 in debt, and its income is $100,000, Russian income would have to go down to $10,000 before it had the same debt to GDP ratio of the USA. And given how much of Russian GDP is oil based, the only realistic way for that to happen is an enormous collapse in the demand for oil from a worldwide depression.

So here we go again, another dumb Dem jerking off to some porn fantasy a prowar think tank is serving up.

To all you prowar dumb Dems, I strongly suggest you get your dicks out of your hand, your heads out of your ass, and start drinking from the well of reality. There is no realistic scenario in which Russia goes bankrupt and the West thrives.

Right Elvis. Paulie's article from the war-promotion institute was hugely and intentionally deceiving. To use his word, it was propaganda.

If the Russian government were to take debt as a % of GDP up from the current level around 12% or 15% to 50%, which would still be low compared to many other countries, it could raise a lot of money for defense. As it could by increasing the income tax rate. And while Russia's defense expenditures as a % of total government expenditures are high, they're still very manageable in relation to the size of the economy.

Indeed, as you say, anyone who believes Russia's going bankrupt isn't "drinking from the well of reality. ".

[Tiny 12]

Russia seems to be doing so great according to your data. It appears the war it started and the sanctions from those Democratic douches are greatly contributing to its economy.

Maybe you shouldn't so vehemently insist on peace talks, considering this amazing economic miracle. Let's give Russia a chance to do even better, eh?

Why not wait until Russia completely overtakes the US and China as two leading world economies?

Which is about to occur any time now per your diligent research.

Russia's army is definitely becoming battle hardened as a result of this conflict.

[Tiny 12]

Could somebody please explain "whataboutism" to me? Does it mean one set of rules applies to Russia and a different set to the USA and the rest of the West? Or does it mean, "It's different this time, because I say so. ".

[Tiny 12]

Tell us about "Robert Wright. " That's a more than common name while there's more than a few around. If you are going to quote him, link us to the source, while telling us who he is.

"Deep State" conspiracy theories aside, you failed to cite any sources at all, why? Embarrassed? We already know Blood Red is.

And according to you all will be well soon. Got it, while you cite no sources, and in fact provide no evidence at all.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/...ecember-a87639

I skipped the history and USA whataboutism as you never established any relevance.

"Defence spending will rise to 13.5 trillion roubles ($145 billion) in 2025, the fourth year of what Russia calls 'a special military operation' in Ukraine, up 25% from the 2024 level.

Defence spending will account for 32% of total 2025 budget expenditure of 41.5 trillion roubles. The draft budget was officially submitted on Monday to the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, for review. ".

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe...25-2024-09-30/

Those expenditures as percentage of the annual budget are extremely high.

700,000+ casusalties and counting, while this by far is the highest level since WW2. There's significant recruitment challenges.

https://cepa.org/article/russias-yea...dier-shortage/

Got it, another rim job for BR of course while repeating his prognostications. Russia is experiencing a bit of a bump in the road at the moment, but all will be well soon. They are going to win no matter what. There's no real difficulties or leverage against them. Ukraine and the West might as well just bend over and grab their ankles now, and get it over with. And this while Western leaders are beginning to concur with this dim assessment. And of course, there's no evidence provided to support any of this, no source citations, while all contrary evidence is dismissed as worthless Western propaganda inspired by "deep state" conspiracy theories. It's the fault of weapons manufacturers who want to fight a dictator, who, sore over the loss of the Soviet empire, decided to try and annex his democracy loving neighbor. And that isn't even an appeal to ridicule fallacy, as it's you in a nutshell. We get it. LOL.

It's worth adding that Russian's inability to wage war isn't a pre-requisite for the fall of Putin. I personally do not know the ultimate outcome, but believe it's in the best interests of the West to stay the course and turn up the heat, in both sanctions and military support, especially if Little Vlad persists in unreasonable demands. The costs of appeasement are greater, monetarily and otherwise than staying the course. I recently posted some well sourced articles that support that.

My first vacation of the year starts Sunday. You all hold down the fort until I return. I don't do politics on vacation, and not even with people I meet along the way.

Make up your mind, is it Kremlin propaganda or Tiny in a nutshell? I know Robert Wright because he wrote The Moral Animal. You should know him because he writes for The Intercept. He's the first Robert Wright who comes up if you Google his name. And the attribution is from the Wikipedia page for your institute for the promotion of war. You'll find the names of the institute's defense-contractor sugar daddies there too. As to the rest of my post, if you have access to a commercial financial database like Bloomberg's and Google, and basic mathematical skills, you can reproduce the numbers in 10 minutes. Without Bloomberg it might take you 20 minutes.

I provided USA economic data solely because I believe youre a fan of Bidenomics and believe the economy did well during his term. The comparison shows Russian macroeconomic numbers are better than the USs, but I could have picked any other country. If you need a primer on the effect of interest rates on inflation please Google it or try ChatGPT.

Russias government debt is so small compared to its GDP that the government can easily handle higher rates. Yes, people with floating rate mortgages and indebted businesses may have a problem and higher rates will slow down GDP growth. But the USA suffered through higher inflation in the 1980s while at the same time increasing its defense budget. Is that more whataboutism?

Hope you have a good trip, seriously. And I'm all for anything that takes you away from your day job with the three letter government agency.